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Foreword
JM Mauskar
In February 2016, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), in 
conjunction with the University of Oxford, organised a round table 
discussion on the ‘Road from Paris’ in New Delhi. The aim of the 
roundtable was to discuss the implementation of the historic Paris 
Agreement agreed upon at COP 21 in December 2015, as the next 
step for enhancing the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). This book features contributions from many of 
the international panelists present at the roundtable discussion as well 
as other scholars from the field of climate policy.
Implementation of the Paris Agreement has raised new issues and 
concerns regarding climate equity, technology, finance and mitigation. 
From an Indian perspective, the question on our mind is if this 
Agreement can meet the needs of India’s development paradigm. 
India’s policy realities reflect four documents – our Cancun pledge 
to reduce the carbon intensity of our economy, the National Action 
Plan on Climate Change, the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) agenda and last but not least, India’s Nationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) for implementing the Paris Agreement. 
Balancing an equitable socio-economic development agenda focused 
on poverty eradication with various climate and sustainability goals 
will indeed be tricky, since India will be the first economy aiming to 
industrialize without using its due share of the carbon budget. 
Besides its domestic imperatives, India’s actions and policies will 
also be influenced by the multilateral frameworks within which 
it seeks to operate. Although the UNFCCC and the related Paris 
Agreement were negotiated and signed by countries, a whole range of 
actors within various tiers of government, the States and the federal 
government, the private sector, think tanks and the non-government 
community will need to put their heads together, to tackle climate 
challenges and attain the SDGs.
During the years spent in the UNFCCC deliberations, I have learnt 
the value of listening to others, especially those one may not agree 
with! This volume is an excellent collection of the thoughts, opinions 
and perspectives from academics and practitioners from across the 
globe on key themes concerning the way forward from Paris and how 
countries can work towards ensuring effective and equitable climate 
action. The challenges in mobilizing resources significant enough 
to tackle climate change and sustainable development; balancing 
adaptation needs with mitigation action; stimulating technological 
innovation that will deliver clean energy breakthroughs; and 
enhancing trust and legitimacy in the Paris Agreement, are the major 
themes that have been debated and discussed in the pages that follow. 
It is my hope that this collection serves to inspire many more debates 
and conversations around the intricacies and problems that will be 
encountered in the implementation of the UNFCCC and the related 
Paris Agreement. The global community needs to strengthen its 
response to climate change and produce outcomes that protect the 
most vulnerable in our societies. Doing so will require us to think 
innovatively and collectively – that is the aim of this publication 
and I congratulate the authors and the editors, Vikrom Mathur and 
Aniruddh Mohan, for bringing this to print. 
JM Mauskar is the former 
Special Secretary, Ministry 
of Environment, Forests and 
Climate Change (MOEFCC), 
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we’ll Always Have Paris
Vikrom Mathur, Aniruddh Mohan
On 12 December in Paris, 196 Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reached 
a landmark agreement: the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, 
described the Paris Agreement as a ‘monumental triumph for people 
and our planet’. 
The new agreement is ‘built-up’ from self-defined national 
contributions of all parties. The evolving climate regime – one that 
combines bottom-up national pledges for climate action with top-
down rules for review, transparency and collective consideration of 
overall adequacy - is a paradigm shift from the architecture of the 
Kyoto Protocol. In Paris, countries found ‘middle ground’, charting 
a new course in a two-decade old effort to respond to global climate 
change.
Will the new agreement precipitate effective and equitable action? 
The Paris Agreement in itself will not save the planet – a multilateral 
agreement could however facilitate action at multiple levels by sub-
national and non-state actors. Climate resilient development, energy 
transitions and processes of technology innovation will all have to be 
re-examined in light of the newly evolving climate regime. 
Climate change is a ‘wicked’ problem. Horst Rittel and Melvin 
Webber introduced the notion of ‘wicked’ problems in 1973.1 
They argued that wicked problems are complex societal challenges 
that lack simple and straightforward resolutions. Climate change 
is deeply connected with many aspects of social and economic 
systems - poverty, marginalization, inequality, and energy access. 
Solutions to climate change can be transformative and/or disruptive, 
precipitating significant redistributive impacts and hard choices 
about jobs, growth and development as well as the use of fossil 
fuels and the lifestyles that are supported as a result. The historical 
responsibility of developed countries in contributing to global 
warming contrasts starkly with the distribution of climate impacts, 
 
which are overwhelmingly concentrated in the global south. Poorer 
countries and their populations are more vulnerable to climate 
change even though they have done little to create the problem in 
the first place. 
The Paris Agreement is not likely to ‘solve’ climate change but 
could prove be a step in the right direction. Global climate policy 
has been anchored in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC brought all 
countries on board a single agreement to tackle the global, collective 
action problem of climate change, delivering global consensus on 
the need to take action under a system of rules and overarching 
structure. It provided the normative umbrella. The Convention also 
enshrined principles that would guide global efforts going forward 
–  Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and 
Respective Capabilities (RC) which acknowledge the differences in 
responsibility for global warming and capability to tackle climate 
change. 
The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 under the UNFCCC was the first 
framework conceptualized for actual reduction of global carbon 
emissions. It mandated developed countries to undertake emission 
reductions while developing countries were spared legally binding 
commitments. Kyoto faced several problems in its implementation 
– the US which was the world’s biggest emitter at the time failed 
to ratify it; other countries backed out at a later date. Developed 
countries wanted emerging economies to come under the mitigation 
regime and accused certain developing nations of free-riding on their 
actions. The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is set 
to end in 2020. 
The search for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol must acknowledge 
its failures. Steve Rayner has called the Kyoto Protocol an ‘elegant 
solution’ to a wicked problem – too simple a solution when more 
clumsy and flexible approaches were required.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
was also mitigation focused; adaptation was not part of the regime. 
However, with increasing severity of climate impacts and the 
recognition that adaptation would be required in the interim while 
countries scale up their mitigation commitments, adaptation started 
to gain prominence in the climate discourse. It became evident that 
a top-down model of differentiation and enforced commitments was 
unworkable – countries would act in their self-interest. 
 
Vikrom Mathur is a Senior 
Research Fellow and Aniruddh 
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New institutionalizing arrangements became the focus of the COP 
process after COP 19 at Warsaw in 2013. The concept of Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) was formalized at Lima, COP 20 
and ahead of the Paris conference, countries submitted their voluntary 
pledges and targets for climate action. As a result, in Paris; rather than 
top-down mitigation targets, the parties opted for a hybrid approach 
– bottom-up pledges and top-down monitoring and review and 
collective assessment of progress – towards a global goal of keeping 
average temperature rise to below 2°C.
The new approach has its own set of challenges. In the case of 
mitigation, compilation of NDCs by parties revealed that they add 
up to global warming of 2.70C, far higher than the 1.5 degrees goal 
called for in the text or even the two degrees goal required to avoid 
dangerous levels of climate change. Countries also do not face any 
penalties for meeting their targets, raising the prospect that actual 
results will be far less ambitious. An absence of legally binding 
commitments on reducing emissions by developed countries in 
particular has led to some calling the Paris Agreement toothless. 
Whether a loose, facilitative and non-punitive agreement can enable 
ambitious action is not clear but criticism of the agreement needs 
to simultaneously factor in the failures of Kyoto which attempted to 
enforce negotiated targets. The agreement calls for a five yearly stock-
take where countries have to report on their progress as well as present 
more ambitious plans each time. Ratcheting up level of ambition 
over time will be critical to ensure that climate action corresponds to 
scientific pressures of limiting temperature rise to a pre-determined 
amount.
This collection brings together a range of policy perspectives on the 
post Paris agenda for climate action. How will the themes of adaptation 
and resilience; energy transitions and technology innovation and; 
the role of non-state actors in the evolving climate regime develop 
under the new regime? What should be the post-Paris policy research 
agenda to drive the implementation of the Paris Agreement?
In his essay in this collection, Steve Rayner argues that there is both 
good and bad news from the Paris outcomes. The good news is that 
it draws a line under the Kyoto Protocol which he contends was 
a doomed exercise in climate reductionism. The bad news is to do 
with the target of limiting temperature rise to 2 degrees. The only 
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that gets us to 
2°C is RPC 2.6, which assumes significant installations of negative 
emissions technologies that would have staggering effects on food 
security, water resources and biodiversity. More pragmatic policy 
responses will be needed – those that support adaptation to current 
climate variability and invest in energy R&D to provide electricity 
access to millions more disconnected from the grid in developing 
nations. 
Adaptation has received more attention in Paris. In his article, Ian 
Fry argues that Paris represents a ‘’significant but not overwhelming 
step forward” with respect to adaptation in climate policy. It has 
created a legally binding obligation on adaptation and reinforced a 
sense of collective responsibility. However, issues around financing 
remain unresolved as does the question of a global goal on adaptation. 
Although loss and damage is included as a major feature of a climate 
agreement for the first time, it nevertheless fails to resolve many 
outstanding issues. There is also some contradiction between the 
spirit of what is conveyed in the agreement and the text of the COP 
Decisions, which for instance preclude any option for liability or 
compensation through the loss and damage clause. Resolving those 
dichotomies will be key to perceptions of equitable outcomes in the 
eyes of Least Developed Countries and Low Lying Island States.
Technology transfer faces many of the same challenges. The 
Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC is central to the 
agreement which also establishes a Technology Framework that will 
provide guidance for the work of the Technology Mechanism. An 
attempt to link financial support with technology transfer is also 
made in the text although it is unclear how that may deliver more 
support to developing nations. In his commentary on the Technology 
Challenge, Anand Patwardhan calls the technology outcomes from 
Paris “modest” and “unambitious”, reliant on existing mechanisms 
under the Convention. One of the positives from the Paris Agreement 
is the focus on innovation for an effective global response to climate 
change. John Alic’s piece on innovation emphasises the role of the 
private sector and actors at the grassroots level in driving change.  
On the question of finance, while the Paris Agreement has made it 
legally binding for developed countries to report on their financial 
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assistance to developing nations, actual targets are not legally binding. 
The USD 100 billion per annum promised by developed countries 
at Copenhagen in 2009 is only mentioned in the preamble of the 
agreement and thus enjoys no legal force. It is instead hoped that 
transparency mechanisms to monitor flow of finance and contributions 
of individual countries will pressure developed nations to step up 
commitments and, therefore, enhance their ambition of supporting 
climate action in developing countries. Aled Jones’ analysis on climate 
finance points to emission trading schemes and green bonds as two 
potential sources of significant finance in the years to come. 
Paris was the first climate agreement to give a significant role to non-
state and civil society actors. Both the Agreement text and conference 
itself embraced actions by cities, cross national alliances, investors, 
companies and civil society. Amy Weinfurter’s article however 
cautions that “while sub-national and non-state activities can help 
spurs and complement climate action, national leadership will still be 
essential to meeting global goals.” 
The polycentric outcome at Paris throws up old questions as much 
as it raises new ones. Addressing challenges over equity, financial 
flows, technology transfer and adequacy of mitigation action will be 
key to the effectiveness, legitimacy and durability of the new regime. 
Our concluding piece argues that a loosely structured agreement 
will need to be held together by building trust amongst actors and 
creating perceptions of legitimacy. Understanding the steps to achieve 
that should be the focus of scholars, practitioners and civil society in 
the years to come. The opportunities and challenges presented by the 
Paris Agreement make it certain that there will be no end to debates 
over governance of our climate just yet. 
1: Rittel, H. W., and Melvin M. Webber. “2.3 planning problems are wick-
ed.” Polity 4 (1973): 155-169.
2: S. Rayner, ‘Wicked Problems: Clumsy Solution – Diagnoses and Pre-
scriptions for Environmental Ills’, Jack Beale Memorial Lecture on Global 
Environment, Sydney, Australia, July 2006.
Future Directions
Steve Rayner
There is both bad news and good news from the Paris talks. The bad 
news relates to the much talked about target for limiting temperature 
rise to 2°C, with an aspiration to 1.5°C. The problem is not with the 
target itself, but the assumptions about how we might meet it. Of 
the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, only one gets us to 2°C, 
i.e. RPC 2.6, which assumes that we have installed a vast amount of 
biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) on a global 
scale. BECCS is a negative emissions technology (NET) whereby 
biomass feedstock is grown and burned to generate electricity, but the 
carbon is captured from the waste stream and stored. Experience with 
the impacts of liquid biofuels production on biodiversity and land 
use, particularly in the tropics, suggests that large-scale deployment 
of BECCS would have significant affects on food security, water 
resources and biodiversity that would be truly staggering.
 
There are other NET options. These include enhanced weathering, 
in which a mineral is spread on land to enhance the ability of soils 
to draw carbon out of the atmosphere; adding calcium or iron to 
the ocean to take carbon out of the air; and large-scale afforestation, 
among others. Some scientists are currently developing mechanical 
devices that would extract carbon from the ambient air, either to 
sequester it underground in a compressed form or convert it into 
carbonate rock. But we really don’t have any firm knowledge about 
whether these technologies will actually work, how reliable they will 
be in practice, or how secure carbon sequestration would be.
 
We also know little about the resource implications of deploying them 
at scale. Could we build this technological system in the timeframe 
that is actually going to have any substantial impact on climate by the 
middle of the century? In the absence of a stable carbon price, who is 
going to pay for all this? How would it be financed? What would be 
the opportunity costs in terms of diverting resources away from other 
climate and development imperatives? Will such technologies pose a 
Steve Rayner is the Director 
of the Institute for Science 
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moral hazard that would lead people to be complacent about efforts to 
pursue conventional mitigation? Do we have an adequate regulatory 
framework?
 
Consequently, there are lots of reasons to suppose this is going to be 
problematic. Yet, at the present moment, no government, no major 
research council or funding body is supporting a proper assessment 
of these technologies. They are just assumed in RPC 2.6. So, the bad 
news is that adopting a goal of 2°C, let alone 1.5°C without some kind 
of negative emissions technology, is to engage in magical thinking. 
Someone should either be funding serious research into these 
technologies or modellers should take these imaginary technologies 
out of the emissions scenarios and recognize that the 1.5°C target is 
much, much harder than has been recognized at Paris. That is the bad 
news.
There is also good news which, to put it bluntly, is that Paris 
finally drove a stake through the heart of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
world wasted 20 years because the Kyoto architecture was based on 
three misleading analogies. The first was the analogy with ozone 
depletion, which appeared to be a model of how to deal with 
anthropogenic releases of gases into the atmosphere. The ozone 
regime, with its framework convention and implementation protocols, 
was a distinctly top-down approach to dealing with CFCs. It worked 
for ozone, but the analogy with climate change was deeply flawed. 
CFCs were industrially produced artificial gases for which there were 
a small number of producers and a readily available technological 
substitute. These conditions do not apply to greenhouse gases.
 
The second analogy was the USEPA Sulphur Trading Programme. 
This was very successful at reducing sulphur dioxide (SO2) pollution 
by allowing polluting electric utilities to burn dirty coal by buying 
spare emission permits from utilities that were generating electricity 
more cleanly. But again, the analogy was flawed. SO2 was a single 
gas, regulating a single legal regime in a small market involving a 
handful of traders. Again this is not a good analogy for global trading 
in multiple greenhouse gases.
 
The third analogy was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 
from which the Kyoto architecture borrowed the idea of mutually 
verifiable staged reductions. But START was a treaty between just two 
The bad news is that 
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magical thinking
governments to control nuclear weapons directly under their control. 
Again this was not a good analogy for dealing with climate change.
 
Subsequently, climate negotiations were an exercise in reductionism, 
whereby the complex issue of climate change was treated as an old-
fashioned 1960s end-of-the-pipe pollution problem, but with national 
pipes. The challenge was simply to cap the amount of stuff coming 
out of these imaginary pipes. This is much too simplistic, particularly 
when we recognize that the world needs much more energy than it 
has at present. There are 1.6 billion people on the planet lacking basic 
energy access. Little wonder that the Kyoto approach was doomed 
from the start and finally abandoned in Paris.
The replacement framework that emerged from Paris is, however, 
uncannily familiar to those who were working on climate policy in 
the 1980s. At the time that the UNFCC was negotiated in 1992, 
the implementation mechanisms under discussion were ‘policies and 
measures’ and ‘pledge and review’. The idea then was to allow countries 
to develop their own policies based on their specific capabilities, 
resource endowments and developmental stages. They would then 
come together periodically to look collectively at what each country 
had achieved and how. The idea was that countries would learn 
from each other – things that work, things that did not work – by 
allowing for a wide range of experimentation by a variety of actors 
and policy mechanisms. This approach was displaced in Kyoto by the 
neoclassical-economic fantasy of global carbon pricing rectifying all 
of the problems associated with climate change.
Paris has returned climate policy to the pre-Kyoto track. The original 
idea of ‘policies and measures’ is now embodied in the ‘nationally 
determined contributions’; ‘pledge and review’ has been reintroduced 
as the proposed five-year review cycle. This has opened the door to a 
‘polycentric’ approach to climate action, which recognizes the diversity 
of the endowments, capacities and development priorities of different 
countries. It substitutes positive local and near-term aspirations for the 
big carbon stick. There is an opportunity to reverse the standard logic 
that climate action will bring ancillary benefits and to argue that the 
best way to control greenhouse gas emissions is to pursue sustainable 
local development, improved air quality and energy modernization. 
These are goals which are good in their own right and which bring 
benefits to people where they are today, not benefits that are going 
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to accrue to people far away in a far distant future. If they are done 
right, they also reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This approach can 
create a discourse of opportunity rather than discourse of constraint. 
The polycentric approach also creates opportunities to address equity 
issues much more effectively than was possible under the previous 
architecture.
 
Another intriguing possible benefit recently suggested by the head 
of the UK Supreme Court, is that although emissions reductions in 
the Paris arrangements are not legally binding under international 
law, they can be made legally binding at national and local levels 
through state legislation, provincial laws and city bylaws. The pursuit 
of a legally binding agreement along Kyoto lines was always really 
meaningless because there was never going to be a proper and effective 
enforcement mechanism.
The polycentric approach also facilitates restructuring of mitigation 
as a technology challenge rather than end-of-the-pipe environmental 
problem. While the past decade has seen massive improvements in 
the costs of renewables, wind and solar energy remain intermittent 
sources and we don’t have very satisfactory ways of storing large 
amounts of energy in power grids, which is required to overcome this 
limitation. Distributed generation with household battery storage 
might work very nicely in suburban southern California but it is not 
going to be a solution for major urban conurbations like Delhi.
 
To deal with technology challenges like energy storage requires 
publicly funded research development, demonstration and deployment 
(RDD&D) to reduce risk to innovators. The success of unconventional 
gas-extraction technology demonstrates the importance of this as it 
was developed largely with US Department of Energy funding. But 
public funding on sustainable energy RDD&D is not nearly enough.
Countries spend significant amounts on research where they see a 
strategic benefit or imperative for them to do so. For example, it has 
been estimated that the US and China spend approximately US$ 
80 billion a year on military R&D. A small carbon tax of US$ 5/
ton could raise about $ 30 billion/year in the US and China and $ 
80-150 billion a year globally, which is consistent with the kinds 
of sums that the International Energy Agency has argued should 
be spent on energy research. India already has a coal tax that is set 
around this level. These kinds of low level taxation specifically aimed 
at investment in technological innovation could be designed into 
the climate agreement internationally or implemented nationally, 
or by multilateral clubs that would not require waiting for a global 
consensus.
 
The energy modernization approach presents real opportunities 
for India and China that were completely absent from the Kyoto 
architecture. China, as we are already seeing, is leading the world in 
cutting the costs of wind and solar generation technologies. India has 
the opportunity to really take the global lead in the smart technologies, 
required for smart grids and smart cities and smart homes.
The polycentric approach adopted at Paris also opens the door for a 
stronger emphasis on adaptation. Adaptation has always been the poor 
cousin of mitigation. Because it has been framed as a cost of failed 
mitigation, adaptation has consistently received a small fraction of 
international funding. We should think about adaptation differently. 
Just as we should reformulate the energy technology challenge from 
being one of limiting emissions to being an energy modernization 
programme, we should reformulate adaptation to climate change as 
adaptation to climate variability.
 
Climate is already dangerous. It kills people all the time through 
extreme weather events. We can save lives and property and enhance 
human dignity today by making significant investments to protect 
people better from climate. Adaptation to climate variability, if done 
right, will also lay the foundations for adaptation to the climate 
change that we are unable to avoid through mitigation. Once again, 
the polycentric framework emerging from Paris provides a more 
promising basis for effective adaptation policies that are relevant to 
local and near-term needs at the same time as tackling climate change.
Just as we should 
reformulate the energy 
technology challenge 
from being one of limiting 
emissions to being an 
energy modernization 
programme, we should 
reformulate adaptation 
to climate change as 
adaptation to climate 
variability
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Implications for Adaptation, 
loss and Damage
Ian Fry
The Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change1 represents a significant, but not overwhelming 
step forward, in the context of adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change and actions to respond to these impacts. This policy paper 
tentatively explores how the international community has advanced 
its policy response to adaptation and loss and damage as a result of 
the agreement.
 
The outcomes from Paris on adaptation and loss and damage can 
be grouped into nine key themes. These include legally binding 
obligations on adaptation; responsibility for action; the politics 
of vulnerability; review mechanisms; funding arrangements; 
accountability; collaboration; the burden of reporting for developing 
countries; and new approaches to addressing climate change impacts: 
loss and damage. This paper will discuss each of these and explore how 
work under these themes will evolve as the Paris Agreement enters 
into force.
 
lEGAllY BINDING OBlIGATIONs ON ADAPTATION 
Finding the right wording to incorporate adaptation in the Paris 
Agreement was not easy. Adaptation is generally considered a 
country driven activity and it proved difficult to find obligations 
to fit within a legally binding agreement, other than ensuring that 
adaptation activities for the most vulnerable countries was properly 
funded. The Paris Agreement, through Article 7 creates a legal 
requirement for all parties to strengthen cooperation on adaptation 
(Article 7.7) and to engage in adaptation planning processes (Article 
7.9). This is a significant step forward as it creates an obligation on all 
countries to take adaptation seriously.
 
During the negotiations there was considerable debate whether or 
not the agreement should include a goal for adaptation. African 
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countries were keen to establish a quantitative goal as a means of 
ensuring that adaptation efforts were tested against a goal. This keen 
interest by African countries for an adaptation goal appeared to be 
driven by the 2014 UNEP Adaptation Gap Report which suggested 
that there were financial, technical and knowledge gaps that hindered 
the diffusion of appropriate adaptation technologies and know-how.2 
Developed countries seem more reluctant to include a quantitative 
goal as it may give rise to expectations of greater financial support 
for adaptation. In the end, the agreement makes a qualitative goal 
of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing 
vulnerability to climate change (Article 7.1).
REsPONsIBIlITY FOR ACTION
The Paris Agreement steered a new path in defining who was responsible 
for taking adaptation action and who was responsible for supporting 
this action. Previously the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change specified that it was the responsibility of the developed world 
to support developing countries that were particularly vulnerable in 
meeting the costs of adaptation (UNFCCC, Article 4.4). The Paris 
Agreement recognizes that adaptation is a global challenge and that 
all parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action 
on adaptation (Article 7.7). This has shifted the traditional North-
South divide towards a more collaborative approach to adaptation 
and has the potential to drive greater efforts in the context of South-
South cooperation.
 
The agreement also encourages the United Nations specialized 
organizations and agencies to support the efforts of parties. While 
many UN agencies are already engaged in providing support for 
adaptation, eliciting their support through a legally binding instrument 
gives greater impetus and direction to their actions. 
 
THE POlITICs OF VUlNERABIlITY
Perhaps one of the most divisive aspects of the adaptation negotiations 
(certainly at least within the G-77 and China) was the reference 
to who was the most vulnerable. As previously noted, Article 4.4 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change makes a 
generic reference to assisting the developing country parties that 
are particularly vulnerable, although the preamble to the convention 
identifies ‘low-lying and other small island countries, countries with 
low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, 
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drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile 
mountainous ecosystems’ as being particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change.
The Bali Action Plan that was agreed in 2007, further narrowed 
the definition of vulnerable countries. It identified that least 
developed countries and small island developing states were especially 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and took into account 
the needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification 
and floods.3 It became apparent that certain countries felt they had 
been missed out in the definition of ‘especially vulnerable’ in the Bali 
Action Plan and did not want this repeated in the Paris Agreement. 
Various formulations were tried. As soon as one group was identified, 
another would make claim. At one stage the G-77 and China 
included in their list of vulnerable countries, ‘territories under 
occupation.’ In the end, the Paris Agreement returns to a generic 
reference to ‘particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change’ (Article 7.6). For small island developing states and 
least developed countries, this represented a significant step 
backwards in recognizing their particularly vulnerabilities. For 
others, it created a level playing field for everyone to be considered 
particularly vulnerable (if such a thing exists in the context of climate 
change vulnerability). 
REVIEw MECHANIsMs
Perhaps one of the key set of elements for adaptation in the 
Paris Agreement are the review mechanisms. These mechanisms 
have two components. The first component is the transparency 
framework for action and support, established in Article 13. The purpose 
of the transparency framework is to provide a clear understanding 
of climate change action, including clarity and tracking of progress 
towards achieve each party’s adaptation actions (Article 13.5).
 
Critically the transparency framework can identify good practices, 
priorities, needs and gaps and will link to the global stocktake 
(Article 14). The transparency framework under Article 13 requires 
each party to provide information on adaptation. Furthermore, 
developing country parties are required to provide information on 
financial, technology transfer and capacity building support needed 
and received (Article 13.10). These actions have the potential to allow 
a global review of adaptation effort and if organized properly, could 
 
identify deficiencies in the system. The process for the reporting 
mechanism has yet to be determined and will be taken up as part of 
the work plan of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement 
(paragraph 95(c), Decision 1/CP.21).
The second element of the review mechanism is the global 
stocktake. This is to be held every five years and includes 
adaptation and means of implementation (Articles 14.1 and 14.2). 
The purpose of the global stocktake is to enhance international 
cooperation for climate action. The first stocktake is to take 
place in 2023, although further work will be required to define 
its modalities of operation. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Paris Agreement has been requested to identify the sources of inputs 
for the global stocktake (paragraph 100, Decision 1/CP.21).
 
The Working Group has been given some guidance with 
respect to reporting on adaptation through the 
accompanying decision in that it should consider the ‘state 
of adaptation efforts, support, experiences and priorities....’ 
(paragraph 100 (ii), Decision 1/CP.21). Compiling a global 
assessment of these parameters on adaptation could be a significant 
effort. Whoever undertakes this synthesis will have a considerable 
amount of work ahead of them.
FUNDING ARRANGEMENTs
The funding arrangements for adaptation in the Paris Agreement 
initially follow the traditional North to South obligations 
(Article 9.1). Nevertheless, there is a shift towards a broadening 
of support to incorporate all parties (Article 9.2). This is quite 
a dramatic step in the globalization of climate change cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it has implications for considerations of the historical 
responsibility for climate change. Undoubtedly some would 
contend that the Paris Agreement undermines the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capability. 
How this will play out in the funding processes remains to be seen.
 
The particular sources of funding for adaptation are not 
clearly enunciated in the Paris Agreement. Decision 1/CP.21 
reiterates the pledge of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 made 
originally in the ill-fated Copenhagen Accord, but this pledge 
is not focused on adaptation funding. It is placed in ‘the context 
Some would contend 
that the Paris Agreement 
undermines the 
principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility 
and respective capability. 
How this will play out 
in the funding processes 
remains to be seen
20 Road from Paris Ian Fry 21
of meaningful mitigation actions’ (paragraph 54 of Decision 1/
CP.21). There are no similar pledges with respect to adaptation 
although the Paris Agreement states that scaled up financial 
resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation 
and mitigation (Article 9.4). The uncertainty over the sources of 
adaptation funding makes adaptation the ‘poor cousin’ in the Paris 
Agreement.
One concession that the agreement makes is that the Adaptation 
Fund ‘may’ serve the agreement subject to the relevant decisions of 
the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (paragraph 60 of Decision 1/
CP.21). This means that two approvals have to be reached before 
the Adaptation Fund can continue. Both institutions would need to 
decide the source of funding for the Adaptation Fund. Its primary 
source currently is the share of proceeds from the sale of certified 
emission reductions from the Clean Development Mechanism. 
It is unclear whether such an arrangement will be duplicated in the 
Paris Agreement. While a carbon trading mechanism or mechanisms 
are likely to be developed (as provided for in Article 6), it is unclear 
whether the carbon market will be a significant generator of enterprise 
within the Paris Agreement and whether a ‘share of proceeds’ concept 
will apply. Much work now rests with the Standing Committee on 
Finance and the Executive Board of the Green Climate Fund to 
determine how funding for adaptation will be apportioned and where 
this funding will come from.
 
In an interesting twist to the ‘vulnerability’ issue, least developed 
countries and small island developing states are identified in the 
finance section of the Paris Agreement as being particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of climate change and having significant capacity 
constraints (Article 9.4). 
ACCOUNTABIlITY
The Paris Agreement creates greater accountability requirements 
for developed countries to provide quantitative and qualitative 
information on the support they provide for adaptation. This 
information is required to be provided biennially. It is interesting to 
note that other parties are also encouraged to provide similar biennial 
information (Article 9.5). This information should link with the 
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global stocktake (Article 9.6).
All parties are required to submit and update periodically an 
‘adaptation communication’ (Article 7.10) and that these submitted 
communications will be kept in a public registry maintained by the 
secretariat (Article 7.12). Having a generic term for an adaptation 
communication is the result of another divisive debate within the 
G-77 and China. There was contention whether or not parties should 
prepare intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) (and 
hence subsequent nationally determined contributions) on adaptation. 
It appeared that many Latin American countries were supportive of 
requiring INDCs for adaptation.
 
In discussions with this group, it appeared that they supported this 
concept as a means of giving greater political prominence to adaptation 
within their national governments. A number of African countries were 
also keen to support INDCs for adaptation, although the least developed 
countries did not support this notion. The LDCs were concerned that 
they already had National Adaptation Programmes of Action and many 
had commenced writing their National Adaptation Plan. Adding a 
further reporting requirement would create an undue reporting burden. 
During the negotiations on adaptation, it appeared that most developed 
countries were not supportive of INDCs for adaptation as this diverted 
the political interest away from mitigation INDCs.
 
The Paris Agreement also requires that each party undertake 
adaptation planning processes, which may include national 
adaptation plans (Article 7.9). The inclusion of the word ‘may’ creates 
considerable flexibility in how adaptation will be carried out and 
reported. It will be interesting to see how all this information is 
collated and assessed.
COllABORATION
The concept of collaboration with other institutions is an important 
element of the Paris Agreement in the context of adaptation action. 
While adaptation is generally considered as a country driven activity, 
it is inevitable that countries will seek external support for their 
endeavours. Article 7 of the Paris Agreement requires that all parties 
should strengthen cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation. 
A list of actions is defined within the agreement. These including 
sharing information on lessons learned, strengthening institutional 
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arrangements, and help developing country parties identify effective 
adaptation practices (Article 7.7 (a-e)).
United Nations specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged 
to support efforts of parties identified in Article 7 (Article 7.8). 
While UN agencies already provide considerable adaptation support 
to countries, establishing an obligation within a legally binding 
agreement will provide greater impetus and incentive for the UN 
agencies to enhance their work in this important area. In prescribing 
this mandate to the UN agencies, they are given a subtle cautionary 
note to take into account important principles identified in Article 7.5 
of the agreement. These principles include: a country driven, gender 
responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into 
consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and 
should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as 
appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples 
and local knowledge systems. This cautionary note to the UN agencies 
will hopefully ensure that they do not impose themselves too heavily 
into the adaptation planning processes of each country.
 
As an aside, it is important to note that both gender and the 
knowledge of indigenous peoples are recognized in the section on 
adaptation. Incorporating their issues and concerns within a legally 
binding agreement is another important step forward.
THE BURDEN OF REPORTING FOR DEVElOPING 
COUNTRIEs
One of the trade-offs for enhanced support for adaptation is the 
increased burden of reporting for developing countries. This issue was 
a point of discussion within the adaptation negotiations. As noted 
earlier, some countries, particularly the least developed countries, 
already have considerable adaptation reporting processes. These 
include National Adaptation Programmes of Action and National 
Adaptation Plans. Article 9.7 of the agreement spells out various 
actions that parties should undertake and report on. These may include: 
national adaptation plans, assessments of climate change impacts and 
vulnerability, monitoring and evaluating and economic diversification 
and sustainable management of natural resources. While all of these 
actions appear to be logical processes within adaptation planning they 
do place a burden on countries with limited capacity to report on their 
efforts.
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For small countries much of their effort on adaptation could be 
spent on reporting rather than actually undertaking action on the 
ground. The concern over the reporting burden is acknowledged 
within the Paris Agreement (Article 7.10). Undoubtedly small 
countries with limited capacity will not produce elaborate adaptation 
communications. As a consequence, there is a fear that these countries 
may miss out on adaptation funding because of the limitations of their 
reporting capabilities. This fear was evident during the negotiations 
and manifested itself within the negotiations concerning INDCs 
for adaptation. It will be interesting to see who receives priority for 
adaptation funding. Will it be provided to the most vulnerable or to 
countries that are more capable in writing adaptation communications?
One of the most innovative outcomes of the Paris Agreement was the 
section relating to loss and damage (Article 8). It was certainly one 
of the most controversial issues within the Paris Agreement. Article 
8 of the Paris Agreement only contains five clauses. Nevertheless, 
it has significant implications for future work on loss and damage. 
It covers a broad spectrum of issues including early warning 
systems; emergency preparedness; slow onset events; events that may 
involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage; comprehensive 
risk assessment and management; risk insurance facilities, climate 
risk pooling and other insurance solutions; and non-economic 
losses (Article 8.4).
NEw APPROACHEs TO ADDREssING ClIMATE 
CHANGE IMPACTs-lOss AND DAMAGE
While Article 8 establishes loss and damage as a legally binding 
process as part of treaty law, the accompanying decision on loss and 
damage is likely to be the key driver for new and innovative work 
(Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 48 to 52). Of particular note are the 
provisions relating to developing a clearing house on risk transfer, and 
establishing a task force to address displacement.
 
The idea for a clearing house emanated from the least developed 
countries in a submission they made in 2014.4 There are many 
examples of risk transfer schemes in Africa and the Caribbean as well 
as national insurance funds and safety net programmes. Establishing 
a clearing house of these schemes will help countries and regions 
identify the best risk transfer opportunities that suit their needs. If 
done properly, the clearing house will be a major fillip for countries 
seeking access to risk transfer measures. Hopefully the insurance and 
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re-insurance industry will be able to provide considerable support in 
this endeavour.
Another major outcome in the decision accompanying the Paris 
Agreement is the request to the Executive Committee of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism (WIM) to establish a task force for 
integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement 
related to the adverse impacts of climate change (paragraph 50, 
Decision 1/CP.21). Initially the least developed countries sought 
inclusion of this task force within the Paris Agreement. This was met 
with significant resistance from the European Union. It appeared to 
be one of the few issues where the European Union took a substantive 
position in the debate on loss and damage.
Due to sensitivities associated with refugees fleeing the war in Syria, 
the European Union appeared to be very reluctant to accept another 
category of displaced people. This is a highly regrettable position and 
one that the European Union may rue in the future. It is inevitable 
that more and more people will become internally and externally 
displaced by the impacts of climate change and action to deal with 
these people will need to be taken. This is not a new issue. Migration 
and human mobility had already been incorporated in the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework in 2010, although little work has advanced on 
this issue since the framework was established.5
 
Despite the resistance from the European Union, language on 
displacement was agreed by the COP. Work on this issue by the 
Executive Committee of the WIM has already commenced and 
is likely to fill the void created since Cancun. Establishing legal 
protection for people displaced by the impacts of climate change 
will be a substantial opportunity for the Executive Committee 
of the WIM and other interested groups and parties. While it is a 
new area of international law, there are opportunities to draw from 
existing institutions and processes. Some have suggested that Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, and the various operational 
guidelines developed as part of the work of the Global Protection 
Cluster, apply to climate related internal displacement situations, and 
offer useful advice and guidance.6
The UN High Commission for Refugees has noted that the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and some regional 
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refugee instruments provide answers to certain cases of external 
displacement related to climate change, and these ought to be analyzed 
further.7 They have suggested however, that the term ‘climate refugee’ 
should be avoided as it is inaccurate and misleading. Work established 
under the Nansen Initiative could provide a useful basis for further 
work in providing appropriate protection for people displaced by the 
impacts of climate change although the Nansen Initiative also deals 
with so-called natural disasters.8
 
The Executive Committee of the WIM can provide a pivotal role in 
coalescing existing work in this field. In saying this, the Executive 
Committee will need to be mindful of work under the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and avoid overlaps.9 
Collaboration with other institutions will be a critical role for the 
Executive Committee of the WIM. It will be important to avoid 
overlapping agendas and potential ‘turf wars’ over mandates and 
responsibilities. The real victims in such mandate disputes will be 
those affected by the impacts of climate change.
Overall, the nine key themes for responding to adaptation and loss 
and damage represent a substantial step forward in international 
environmental law. It creates significant new opportunities to assist 
countries build resilience and respond to the adverse affects of climate 
change. New initiatives such as those relating to a clearing house on 
risk transfer and a task force on displacement will provide considerable 
opportunities to afford appropriate protection for the most vulnerable. 
This work must progress at pace if it is going to meet the demands of 
a world confronting the ever growing threats of climate change. The 
challenge will be to find adequate and predictable funding to meet 
the growing needs of those affected by the impacts of climate change.
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A Matter of Capabilities
Heleen de Coninck
We tend to think about mitigation of climate change merely as a policy 
challenge to reduce emissions. If we, however, think about what drives 
policies, we arrive at more fundamental questions related to domestic 
constellations of the economy, political risk-taking, innovation and 
capabilities. Though the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism and the 
Paris Agreement address these questions, both could do more.
 
Botswana is a middle-income country of about two million 
people – sparsely populated, with good institutions, great solar energy 
resources, and lots and lots of coal in the ground. Its relative wealth has 
largely been generated by well managed diamond exports. Recently, it 
has had to develop its electricity system in order to meet growing 
demand, as imports from neighbouring South Africa have declined. 
The government is well aware of the vulnerability of hot and arid 
Botswana to climate change, and has progressive views on mitigation. 
However, it is facing difficult choices in deciding how to diversify 
its economy away from diamonds and fuel its further development: 
using easily available coal, or investment-heavy and technically more 
challenging solar.
 
The Netherlands is a highly industrialized country of close to 17 
million inhabitants. Its economy relies heavily on energy intensive 
industry, the transportation sector and its sizable gas reservoirs. Within 
the EU, the Netherlands is among the highest per capita greenhouse 
gas emitters, despite having shown leadership on climate change as 
early as the late eighties. A reliance on fossil fuels for many of its 
economic activities means that the Netherlands is firmly locked into 
the fossil economy. The government has plans to reduce emissions, but 
in practice, over the past decades, the social and economic interests of 
those invested in fossil fuels have prevailed. 
 
Indonesia, Qatar, India, the United States, South Africa, Argentina 
and every single country, big and small, has its own specific story 
and mitigation challenges, deeply intertwined with the economy, 
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energy supply and agricultural system. None of the world’s countries 
are against mitigation. None are opposed to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. What many countries expect (and fear), however, is 
great economic damage if they reduce emissions and decarbonise. 
If a country (or, for that matter, a politician) does not stand to gain 
from the transition, it will be disinclined to implement costly and 
risky measures towards that transition. The gains do not need to be 
only financial: they can be jobs, economic development, government 
income, energy security, political clout, etc.
 
Countries need to perceive benefits from mitigating climate change. 
And the politically credible narrative for such benefits will be different 
for every country. Abandoning production and consumption of fossil 
fuels needs to be a part of it, but the more interesting question is: what 
economic activity will replace them? And how can this economic 
activity be as, and preferably even more, attractive to the country? 
This is where innovation comes in. The most common argument why 
innovation is key is that mitigation technologies need development 
and cost reductions, and innovation can provide this. However, 
I would argue that those positives should be seen as side effects of 
innovation. The central aim of low-carbon innovation should be to 
serve the economic development of countries while helping them 
move onto a low-carbon trajectory. Finance for innovation can do this 
by funding R&D programmes, but mostly by developing the right 
kind of local capabilities. Only then can Botswana, India or Indonesia 
develop their own, nationally specific, low-carbon economies. 
 
How do countries know that they are developing the right 
capabilities for sustainable economic development? If we look at 
highly developed economies, we see that their workforce features a 
myriad of skills. Three rough categories of technological capabilities 
are often distinguished. First, we need people who can operate and 
maintain equipment, and repair it if needed. These are basic skills 
that are present in practically all countries, although in many poorer 
countries they are in short supply for advanced or relatively novel 
technologies. 
 
Second, the capability to adapt technologies to local circumstances, 
and to manufacture the core equipment as well as spare parts is 
needed. Especially if a technology is likely to be used extensively in a 
country, importing it from other countries will be relatively expensive 
and unlikely to benefit the local economy. Of course, not all countries 
will be producing all the technologies they use; also now not every 
country is manufacturing cars, solar panels, gas turbines or airplanes. 
Among other factors, the technological complexity and local market 
size of each piece of equipment will determine the intensity of 
international competition for global market share. However, those 
countries without any or with insufficient capabilities are certain to 
lose out and will be destined to import while the profits are made 
elsewhere.
 
Third and finally, it is important to possess the ability to innovate 
on technology, to improve manufacturing processes, to conduct 
fundamental research and to develop new technology. In practice, 
these capabilities are most present in industrialized countries, with 
China becoming an important player, as demonstrated by research 
into patent databases.
In addition to technological capabilities in companies, among 
entrepreneurs and within research institutions, capacity in the public 
sector to regulate new technology and to make effective policies for 
implementation and innovation is important. Often, the development 
of more advanced capabilities follows a parallel path to maturing 
institutions, but not always. 
 
Scholars in innovation and development studies have examined how 
to evaluate whether the necessary capabilities are present and how they 
can best be built. They came up with the term ‘innovation system’, and 
identified functions that need to be fulfilled in such a system in order 
for it to realize a certain technology in a national context, or to reach 
a flourishing, innovative economy. Such functions include knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation, and legitimation by 
the wider public and by law.
 
It is not easy to build a flourishing innovation system around low-
carbon technology, particularly if the ‘background’ innovation system 
is poorly developed, like in most developing countries. Also, different 
functions need to be promoted at the same time as they need to 
reinforce each other. If knowledge is developed around a certain 
mitigation technology, but no capital is available for its entry in the 
market, it will still not be implemented.
The central aim of low-
carbon innovation should 
be to serve the economic 
development of countries 
while helping them 
move onto a low-carbon 
trajectory. Finance for 
innovation can do this by 
funding R&D programmes, 
but mostly by developing 
the right kind of local 
capabilities
30 Road from Paris Heleen de Coninck 31
If an innovation system around low-carbon technologies remains 
underdeveloped in a country, that economy will not have a built-in 
incentive to continue investing in low-carbon transition. It is unlikely 
that such a country will modify its trajectory. Therefore, it is essential 
that capabilities are developed, or else pledges in the Paris Agreement 
will not be met. 
 
This is not new, and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change of 1992 already acknowledged the importance of 
capabilities, included under both technology transfer and capacity 
building arrangements. However, Article 4.5 on technology transfer 
has had limited impact on the ground. As a response, during COP16 in 
Cancun in 2010, the Technology Mechanism was initiated, consisting 
of a ‘policy arm’ called the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) 
and an implementation arm, called the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network (CTCN). The CTCN is supposed to fulfil some of the 
functions in an innovation system. Primarily, it responds to requests 
for support by developing countries around building institutional and 
innovation capabilities. However, it is limited by small budgets, as it 
has no structural funding. 
 
Around both the TEC and the CTCN’s activities, it is interesting 
to observe the political economy in most countries which favour 
fossil fuels. Industrialized countries, leaders in the global technology 
market, which the UNFCCC and the Cancun Agreement anticipate 
to be donors to the Technology Mechanism, are reluctant to invest in 
capacity development abroad, partly for fear of creating their future 
challengers in the global technology leadership race. This attitude has 
inhibited funding for innovation capabilities in developing countries. 
The result is that the CTCN is severely underfunded, and the TEC 
suffers from highly politicized and largely ineffective discussions. 
Something needs to change for the Technology Mechanism to reach 
its aims. 
Although some progress was made at COP21 in Paris, the discussions 
on technology did not move forward. Industrialized countries opposed 
strong commitments to North-South and South-South R&D 
collaboration as well as binding, significant support to developing 
countries. Developing countries argued for a strong link with the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) so that technology related programmes 
could count on funding from the GCF, allowing for structural 
instead of the current incidental support. For a long time it looked 
like agreement on technology was going to be difficult, but finally a 
compromise text did emerge. 
 
Article 10 on technology in the Paris Agreement emphasizes R&D 
cooperation, hints at a link with finance, and reinforces the existing 
Technology Mechanism. However, it is only a mild addition to the 
Technology Mechanism as agreed in 2010. Although the importance 
of collaboration on R&D between institutions in different countries 
is re-emphasized, as well as the need for developed countries to fund 
or finance such efforts in developing countries, no firm commitments 
were made. From a legal point of view, the commitments are 
sufficiently vague so that they can easily be ignored by countries 
without consequences. 
 
Much of technology transfer happens outside of formal 
UN institutions. But we have seen that it does not happen 
sufficiently withour intervention. The UNFCCC ought to develop 
itself as a catalyst for meaningful and politically salient action that 
helps countries get onto self-reinforcing low-carbon trajectories 
by developing capabilities for low-carbon economies. The basic 
institutions are in place in the form of the UNFCCC Technology 
Mechanism, but it desperately needs strengthening in order to play its 
envisioned role. For this, developed countries should overcome their 
fear of creating competition in the global low-carbon technology 
marketplace, and developing countries and UN institutions need to 
be more convincing that the funding will be spent wisely. If this is 
not done, the implementation of the Paris pledges, and eventually the 
temperature goal, might easily get out of reach.
So in what research agenda does this result? Questions could include, 
for each country, what capabilities are most needed and under 
which circumstances international action can be helpful in building 
them. Research could contribute to developing a narrative for 
developed countries that makes financing low-carbon technology 
transfer attractive and in their self-interest. Another important 
question is what projects in the GCF could be ‘Technology 
Mechanism-proof ’. But most importantly, the above suggests that 
the long-standing question of innovation, economic development and 
sustainability is still not sufficiently understood to build international 
institutions that work.
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Energy-Climate Innovation
John Alic
Stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHGs) in accord with 
the Paris targets will require very large reductions in energy related 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This can only be achieved through 
continuous, aggressive and ongoing innovation. Innovation of this 
sort depends, in turn, on rapid diffusion, adoption and adaptation, 
processes that are integrally linked with ‘upstream’ technological 
advance through feedback loops embedded in economic markets.
 
Policy makers sometimes seem to hope that ‘breakthroughs’ will 
emerge fortuitously to sweep existing technologies aside. Such hopes 
are misplaced, if not naïve, for two reasons. First, true breakthroughs 
– radical innovations – are rare and unpredictable, and no one knows 
how to foster them other than by spending more money on relatively 
fundamental research. This may be desirable; yet at the same time new 
technologies tend to be costly and unreliable, and offer relatively poor 
technical performance when first introduced.
 
Improvement comes over time periods commonly measured 
in decades: this was true of solar photovoltaic (PV) cells, 
invented in the mid-1950s; gas turbines introduced earlier in the 
twentieth century; and steam power going back to Newcomen 
and Watt in the eighteenth century. Over the next several 
decades, accordingly, the world should expect to work with what it 
has, existing technologies that can and will – because this is inherent 
in innovation – advance on technical measures of performance (e.g. 
efficiency) and reduction in costs (in most cases) through continuous, 
incremental innovation.
 
The difficulties will be great. They are practical difficulties, 
chiefly concerned with devising and implementing policies to 
foster upstream advance and at the same time strengthen the feedback 
loops that link applications experience with science, research and 
engineering, while avoiding lock-in of the sort that at present slows 
decarbonization of electrical power in wealthy countries. 
As the world moves toward decarbonization, large-scale, system-
wide, socio-technical-economic changes will play out. There will be 
much Schumpeterian creative destruction. Although cumulatively 
transformative, it is not very helpful to think of these processes as 
amounting to some sort of ‘transition’ – a too-comforting term that 
suggests manageability between stable states. Since the dynamics will 
involve continuing change, unpredictable and frequently disorderly, 
and since governance too is messy and unpredictable, it would be 
better to think in terms of migration; migrants, after all, often end 
up at other than their expected or desired destinations (and may then 
seek to move on).
wHAT DO wE KNOw ABOUT ENERGY-ClIMATE 
INNOVATION? 
• Point 1: Profit-seeking businesses conceive, develop, and 
introduce most new technologies. As Edmund Phelps, 2006 Nobel 
laureate in economics, notes, ‘An awful lot of innovation just comes 
from business people operating at the grassroots having ideas on the 
basis of what they see around them. Nothing to do with science – it’s 
just creative mankind chipping away at things.’1
 
Governments make two main contributions. They feed the knowledge 
base through funding for research and education. Second, procurement 
– for instance, of public works and infrastructure, of military systems 
– also stimulates innovation. Private firms exploit the publicly funded 
knowledge base and government purchases create initial markets 
for many emerging technologies; examples include the first PV cells 
and integrated circuits (ICs) and also the gas turbines that utilities 
so often now buy for electric power generation. The implication: 
Effective innovation policies will provide incentives for profit-seeking 
businesses. This is true worldwide, although mechanisms will differ 
from country to country. 
 
• Point 2: Most innovations carry high costs and perform poorly 
when first commercialized, meaning that the pace and extent of 
ongoing incremental advance determines whether or not innovations 
survive and continue to improve (or vanish from the marketplace). 
The first solar PV cells were inefficient (5-6%) and too expensive for 
applications other than space systems. Much the same was true of 
other transformative innovations rooted in solid-state physics, such as 
IC chips, and for gas turbines and jet engines. Gas turbines operate on 
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a thermo-dynamic cycle patented in 1872, and several firms introduced 
industrial turbines in the first decade of the twentieth century; even less 
efficient than the steam engines of the time, they soon disappeared for 
lack of sales. Test-stand demonstration of jet engines followed in the 
1930s, spurred by the coming world war. The first jet aircraft guzzled 
far more fuel than piston-engine planes – some could stay aloft for 
no more than 10 or 15 minutes – and needed major maintenance 
every few dozen hours. Yet, their military advantages were such that 
development continued and, as manufacturers learned over time to 
improve efficiency and longevity, costs came down and utilities began 
to buy turbines based on ‘cores’ designed for aircraft propulsion, first 
for peaking power and then for base load applications.
As cumulative technical advance reduces costs and improves 
performance, applications expand. For the technologies mentioned 
above – PV cells, ICs (and computers, smartphones, and so on), 
gas turbines – the gains have been accumulating for decades and 
should continue more or less indefinitely. This is the usual process of 
innovation, one in which breakthroughs such as the first PV cell or 
the first IC or first successful jet engine, simply mark the initial step 
on a long pathway, one that often branches as a result of subsequent 
developments (e.g., thin film PV cells, turbines designed specifically 
for utility service). The implication: Governments must support 
innovation over lengthy time periods, using multiple tools (including, 
e.g., procurement); it is not enough simply to support research. 
• Point 3: Energy differs from many other technologies in that, 
as a commodity, incentives for innovation are weak. Firms that 
supply energy – although not firms that design and produce goods 
and services that depend on and consume energy – cannot expect 
to differentiate their products. Price is what matters to customers, 
which means that costs are what matters to producers, distributors, 
and end-suppliers. By contrast, firms in other industries can focus on 
product features they expect will appeal to customers: ICs that draw 
less power, yielding greater smartphone battery life; passenger cars 
with heated seats and more horsepower; pickup trucks with powered 
tailgates. 
 
Given the commodity nature of energy, it is easy enough to argue 
that prices are too low to induce much innovation. Certainly a price 
on carbon would, if high enough, stimulate much technological 
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improvement and application expansion. Yet, efforts to establish such 
policies have come to little, and the Paris meeting probably marks the 
end of much beyond the sort of local and regional initiatives the world 
has recently begun to see. Furthermore, no one can know what price 
levels would be needed to cut GHG emissions quickly and rapidly, 
while even in wealthy countries high energy prices would mean 
hardship for many and, in poorer countries, would be devastating for 
billions. The implication: Governments will have to subsidize energy 
innovation heavily to drive needed advances into the marketplace.
 
• Point 4: The Mission Innovation initiative announced in Paris by 
twenty governments, including that of India, will be more effective 
if it targets innovation broadly, including diffusion and incremental 
gains, rather than narrowly focusing on research, which is how it 
has mostly been read. Much the same is true of the private sector 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition publicized by Bill Gates and others. 
Yet, even if restricted to R&D – which costs far less than downstream 
development, testing, and applications-oriented engineering – the 
sums announced can only be viewed as falling well short of the needs.
The Mission Innovation statement calls for a doubling of 
‘governmental investment in clean energy innovation.’ According 
to the International Energy Agency (IEA), spending by member 
countries on ‘public energy technology research, development and 
demonstration’ (RD&D) totalled about $ 17 billion in 2014. IEA 
members account for the great bulk of world spending on energy-
climate RD&D (led in 2014 by the United States at $ 6.3 billion, 
followed by Japan at $ 3.3 billion, with France and Germany the only 
other countries reporting public RD&D expenditures of more than 
$1 billion). By almost any standard of comparison, these totals seem 
modest, and would be so even if doubled.
 
For context, consider air transportation, an industry that accounts 
for a minor share of energy related GHG emissions, less than 2.5% 
of the world total (or 10-11% of transport related emissions, the 
bulk of which stem from road vehicles). Airlines nonetheless go to 
some length to publicize their commitments to lowering energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions – easily understandable since 
jet fuel accounts for one-third or more of their operating costs 
(depending on price levels), expenditures that translate quite directly 
to profit and loss statements. Thus when shopping for new equipment, 
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airlines press airframe manufacturers (Airbus, Boeing) and jet engine 
firms (Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, General Electric) to reduce fuel 
consumption. The resulting innovations carry high price tags.
 
When deliveries of Pratt & Whitney’s geared turbo fan began late in 
2015, after nearly 30 years of development (slow-paced because oil 
prices were low over much of the period), the R&D costs alone were 
reported at $10 billion. For this sort of expenditure, airlines anticipate 
fuel burn to decline by around 15% (depending on routes flown). 
R&D costs for Boeing’s 787 came to a good deal more, in part because 
of the plane’s troubled launch and early teething troubles. Built largely 
from lightweight composite materials – less weight means less fuel 
per passenger-mile – R&D spending for the 787 has been put at $28 
billion. And to reiterate, air transportation is one among a great many 
sources of CO2 emissions, and nowhere near the top of the list. The 
implication: Even a doubling of public spending on energy-climate 
RD&D will result in total expenditures that seem modest relative to 
the need (and to private-sector spending).
• Point 5: Technologies diffuse internationally chiefly through 
channels created by private firms in the ordinary course of doing 
business. While national innovation systems differ, many countries 
today have the human and organizational skills needed both to 
innovate and to absorb and adapt new technologies, along with the 
requisite financial resources and market conditions. Examples include 
Brazil’s migration to sugarcane ethanol and a road vehicle fleet 
adapted to this fuel, consequences of mostly indigenous innovation. 
Other illustrations include high-volume manufacture of PV cells at 
low costs in China and rapid penetration of both solar and wind power 
in parts of Europe. As these sorts of country-level and regional-level 
dynamics proceed, technology diffuses internationally through the 
day-to-day activities of profit seeking firms. Technologies move (as 
artifacts, as knowledge) within multinationals (within and between 
divisions), among unaffiliated firms linked by contractual agreements 
(both vertical and horizontal), and through joint ventures and strategic 
alliances (taking many forms).
 
The implication: Governments should rely on private-sector channels 
for diffusion of energy-climate innovations. These channels can be 
expected to function more effectively – because of profit incentives – 
than efforts organized and managed by governments, non-profits, or 
intergovernmental organizations. Innovative policies will strengthen 
private sector channels without seeking to replicate them, while also 
protecting public interests.
Decades of debate and discussion over responses to climate change 
have overlooked or oversimplified the dynamics of innovation, 
diffusion, adoption, and adaptation. It is wishful thinking to expect 
some sort of energy technology ‘breakthrough’ to emerge from 
research. Innovation is a continuous process best viewed in terms 
of learning: technological learning; organizational learning; policy 
learning. What will be needed in the years ahead are practical 
strategies and structured priorities that capitalize upon and provide 
incentives for private firms, guided by realistic road maps rather than 
the wish lists that too often emerge from governments. To have any 
real hope of reducing GHG emissions sufficiently to approach or 
meet the Paris targets, governments will have to identify and pursue 
better functioning innovation policies. The effort should be at the 
heart of the post-Paris agenda.
1: Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn, ‘Interview with Edmund S. 
Phelps’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(3), 2009, pp. 109-124; quota-
tion from p. 123.
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Energy Transitions in China
Wang Tao
ENERGY TRANsITION IN CHINA AND EXPERIENCEs 
TO OTHERs
Ensuring a successful energy transition is crucial as we try to limit 
temperature rise to no more than two degrees Celsius by the end of 
the century, as agreed to at the Paris Climate Summit in December 
2015. It is also now clear that though more difficult, the need for 
an energy transition is far greater in large developing countries such 
as China and India. Since the energy demand in these countries is 
growing rapidly, a transition to low carbon and sustainable sources 
would not only help avoid a huge lock-in with expensive and high 
carbon energy infrastructure, but also demonstrate the possibility of a 
different path to others in the developing world who are looking for 
development and prosperity in this century.
 
Technology holds the key to enabling an energy transition. Technology 
development in renewable energy has already driven down the cost 
of wind turbines and solar PV panels to about one-tenth of what 
it was even a decade back. In countries such as Germany, US and 
China where these technologies are mass manufactured and installed, 
generation costs from these renewable energy sources are increasingly 
becoming competitive in comparison to the traditional coal and gas 
fired power plants. Electric vehicles are quietly changing people’s 
preference in many countries, and sales have grown exponentially in 
the last few years so much so that there is growing concern among 
oil producers about possible impacts on oil price, not in the distant 
future, but as soon as 2030. Finally, with improved energy storage 
and smart grids, the world is also steadily moving away from the old 
school of having robust, centralized energy systems to decentralized 
generation and networks to improve the security of power supply.
 
A common mistake made by most developing countries is to assume 
that acquisition of technology by itself would automatically lead to an 
energy transition. This may explain why they focus more on getting 
the technology rather than on modulating policy, regulatory systems 
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and business environment that nurture the technology in the first 
place. This has also resulted in intensive discussions on technology 
transfers between the industrialized world and emerging countries 
such as China and India. Drawing upon experiences from China’s 
successes and difficulties in traversing this course could provide some 
useful insights to other developing countries.
 
To better understand this argument, we need to ask the following 
questions. Will technology transfer necessarily facilitate the 
development of improved technology capacity in the recipient 
country? Second, can improved technology by itself facilitate an 
energy transition?
The answer to the first question is a clear no. Technology transfer 
involves three different streams, each operating at different levels. 
The first relates to the transfer of equipment, service and design to be 
used, basically making available the technology to users. The second 
stream involves the transfer of skills and know-how for operation and 
maintenance, knowing why the technology operates the way it does. 
These two streams together help the recipient country to build new 
production capability. The third, and the most critical stream, involves 
acquiring the knowledge and expertise behind the technology, thereby 
enhancing the capacity of national innovation systems which is 
what will enable invention to take place and accumulate for further 
improvement.
 
Previous cases of technology transfer to China, India and countries 
like Malaysia have mostly focused on the first two streams or, 
sometimes, only on the first stream. However, without the third 
stream of technology transfer, a country is unlikely to see significant 
improvement in its technology capability. It is, however, insufficiently 
realized that for the third stream of technology transfer to be 
operational, a country needs both a vibrant culture of entrepreneurship 
and an enabling market environment, as well as requisite government 
support to be able to develop its own national innovation system.
Experience from China also suggests that it should be business and 
not the government which manages the innovation. Government 
interventions in industrial decisions and ill-designed subsidies 
that attempt to hasten the innovation process often result in poor 
outcomes. The process works much better when companies have a 
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strong incentive to acquire certain technologies and invest resources 
of their own to absorb the technologies most suitable for the local 
market. Simultaneously, governments must realize that technology 
learning is a process that works better if it is bottom-up rather than 
top-down. In the technology transfer framework agreed to in Paris, 
a greater effort needs to be made to increase the engagement of local 
business so that they can drive the process instead of taking it as given.
 
The degree of preparedness in the market too needs to be given due 
consideration before the recipient governments make their request for 
low carbon technologies from the countries /firms which have them. 
There are also bound to be significant differences in requirements for 
national technological capacity when seeking transfer of sophisticated 
technologies such as gas turbines, which only five companies in the 
world possess, as against more readily available ones such as biomass 
and solar PV panels. It also requires very different conditions to 
facilitate such technology transfer, further adjusted and improved to 
suit a country’s specific conditions, and taking into account the needs of 
local partners. Thus, the answer to the second question too is a clear no.
As a global leader in renewable energy, China has benefited a lot from 
technology transfers from the industrialized countries by ensuring a 
combination of strong policy support by government, a large domestic 
market, and the presence of vibrant entrepreneurs investing in these 
energy technologies. Even then, it took more than a decade for China 
before the resources it invested in these sectors started to pay out. 
In the first decade of the new millennium when China acquired 
advanced wind and solar energy technologies and emerged as a world 
leader in renewable power installation there was no energy transition. 
If anything, the share of coal in China’s energy mix actually increased 
during that time.
 
Though wind technology got an early start in China, it did not become 
popular until the government started to promote it by providing 
special concessions which ensured a guaranteed return to developers 
for their investment. The government also pushed technology transfer 
through joint ventures by specifying a high local content requirement 
for wind farms supported by government subsidy. The most significant 
technology transfer of wind power actually took place when leading 
Chinese wind manufacturers went on to purchase second tier wind 
power companies in Europe after the economic crisis, as did the 
Indian leader, Suzlon. But acquisition of this technology by itself 
did not lead to much change, mainly because consumers who prefer 
green electricity realized that a large share of electricity generated 
from wind was not readily accessible to the power grid due to various 
conflicting interests in the system. This is why even though China has 
installed the world’s largest wind power generation capacity, the actual 
generation from wind power is about one-third less than the US. In 
2015, the output of wind power generation was only as much as the 
generation from the giant Three Gorges Dam.
The story of the solar PV industry is similar to that of the wind sector. 
Initially taken up by local manufacturers, considerable effort has been 
expended both by the government and the business sector in making 
huge investments to absorb the technologies. Unlike in the case of 
wind turbines, which were not only regulated through licencing and 
technologies had to be sourced from international competitors, a lot 
of money was invested into the innovation of the solar PV technology 
as it is relatively simple. Technology transfer thus followed a different 
route to that of the wind industry, though in the end China was 
able to create a world class manufacturing capacity with advanced 
technology, despite a few setbacks during the trade disputes with the 
EU and USA.
 
In both the cases of wind and solar PV, the dominant players 
driving the technology capacity improvement were private investors, 
though policy support and certainty in development targets was 
helpful. However, when it comes to more sophisticated low carbon 
technologies such as high speed railway and third generation nuclear 
power, the technological and institutional barriers are so high that, 
at least in China, only state owned enterprises (SOEs) are interested 
in and in a position to pursue the technology. Yet, despite the huge 
influence and deep pockets of Chinese SOEs, success is far from 
guaranteed in the pursuit of technology for the reasons discussed 
above. Often one may need the support of a charismatic figure to 
break through the political and institutional barriers to facilitate the 
penetration of the new technology into a sluggish system.
What we have also seen in China, despite becoming a global leader, 
is that none of these technologies has necessarily led to an energy 
transition. Even as low carbon energy technologies have enjoyed a fast 
growth in China in the last decade, so too has coal, understandable 
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at a time when China is desperate for increased energy and thus 
looking at all options. So if new technologies are growing, it is more 
because of the increased demand for energy and not because they 
are the favoured choice in the given market conditions and currently, 
renewable energy accounts for only a small slice of the market. 
Huge investments were poured in renewable energy based on the 
government promised subsidies, but over-reliance on subsidy in turn 
led to the creation of excess capacity in the industry as neither its 
domestic deployment nor overseas market could be guaranteed by 
the government. Thus investment in low carbon technology that was 
occasioned by government policies has now become a liability instead 
of serving as the foundation for further innovation, as fast changes in 
low carbon technology have made these appear as locked-in assets in 
last generation technologies.
 
The energy transition in China that we are now talking about only 
happened because of two unrelated developments. The first is the 
severe smog prevailing in Beijing and North China which became 
a matter of huge concern to the middle class and possibly resulted 
in a small-scale political crisis. The second was the slowing down of 
the economy, in part resulting from a serious overcapacity in heavy 
industries. Further, because of the environmental measures needed to 
improve the air quality, as also for addressing the slowing down of 
the economy, China has seen a reduction in coal consumption and a 
lowering of carbon emission on an annual basis for the first time in 
decades. The continuous increase in the use of renewable energy in 
this context may lead to a more noticeable change in China’s energy 
structure, with implications for its energy future.
So, what lessons does China offer for other developing countries? 
First, low carbon technology transfer comes with different streams, 
and the best way of acquiring the low carbon technology will depend 
on the nature of technology, the capacity of the recipient country 
and its business environment. Governments need to focus more on 
building a supportive environment for the technology and let business 
drive the process, instead of choosing for them.
 
Second, improvements in technological capability by itself cannot 
lead to a successful energy transition, especially when, at least so far, 
without government subsidies renewable energy is not a favoured 
choice. Developing countries seeking a low carbon energy transition 
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must understand that critical for success is changing the operating 
conditions of the market so that it favours low carbon technology 
and embracing the transition early instead of delaying it until some 
external event makes it imperative.
Third, since the process of innovation cannot be rushed, the 
government needs to exercise patience. The key is to strengthen the 
foundations of a national innovation system in which innovation can 
emerge and flourish, rather than pick the winner by distorting the 
market. For example, levying a uniform carbon tax will both result in 
reducing carbon emissions and favour renewable energy over fossil 
fuels. Providing additional support (subsidies) for using a specific low 
carbon technology is unlikely to promote innovation.
 
Fourth, for a new technology to be mainstreamed, the greater need is 
to focus on the business model instead of the scale of its deployment. 
Large-scale use that is only made possible by public funding support 
risks a lock-in at the early stages of technology. This is likely to be 
costly especially when developments in low carbon technology are 
picking up pace. Nurturing a viable business model is a better way 
to create an enabling environment, which is far more important than 
merely meeting a prescribed target.
This is a good time for countries like India, Brazil, and other emerging 
economies to follow suit in the pursuit of low carbon energy transition, 
not only because the cost of low carbon technologies – from wind 
turbines to solar PV panel – have declined by more than 90 per cent 
over the last decade, but also because the world now knows more about 
and is willing to accept those technologies. There is also new thinking 
about decentralized energy and its contribution to the safety of the 
electricity system. Entrepreneurs, who are key if one is to ratchet up 
the development of these technologies, are waiting eagerly for policy 
support for the market for new low carbon technology.
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The Technology Challenge
Anand Patwardhan
THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOlOGY 
The magnitude of the technology challenge in moving towards 
a low-carbon climate resilient future is considerable. To meet the 
two degree target, the world needs to decarbonize at an annual rate 
of between 4 and 10 per cent from now on, depending on population 
and economic growth assumptions. Historically, only a few countries, 
such as Sweden and France, have been able to decarbonize at these 
rates and this has been accomplished by more rapid deployment 
of non-fossil electricity generation – hydropower in the case of Sweden 
and nuclear in the case of France. Global rates have been much lower 
(about 1.3% over 2000-2013). The more rapid (approximately 2%) 
decrease rate for most western economies in recent years is inflated due 
to a decreasing manufacturing sector and concomitant increased imports.
 
Most IPCC scenarios that leave decarbonization to later 
dates require negative emissions relying on carbon capture and 
sink technologies that currently show no prospect of being 
commercially deployable. Other, more proven non-fossil energy 
technologies such as nuclear or renewables are expensive and 
often not affordable by poorer countries. However, rapid 
decarbonization will require improvement and innovation in 
precisely these technologies – and therein lies the challenge facing a 
technology agenda for climate response.
 
TECHNOlOGY AND THE PARIs AGREEMENT 
Despite widespread agreement about the importance of technology, 
and the presence of a number of innovative proposals in earlier 
versions of the negotiating text, the final form of the Paris Agreement 
is relatively modest and unambitious with regard to technology. 
For the most part it relies on the Convention’s existing technology 
mechanism, including the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) 
and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).
 
On the positive side, it does place a new focus on innovation as ‘critical 
for an effective, long-term global response to climate change.’ It 
commits the UNFCCC’s technology and financial bodies to support 
R&D and developing countries’ access to technology, ‘in particular for 
early stages of the technology cycle.’
 
Perhaps potentially of equal significance are related initiatives 
launched at Paris, such as Mission Innovation and the 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition. The relationship of these initiatives 
with the formal multilateral process remains a key question for the 
road ahead from Paris.
KEY IssUEs RElATED TO THE ROlE OF TECHNOlOGY 
As we consider the role of technology for achieving an ambitious and 
equitable global response to climate change, four key issues will need 
to be considered: 
 
• Accelerating action across the entire technology cycle: In order 
to realize the full potential of technology, it will be important 
to work towards coordinated action across the entire technology 
cycle – from basic and applied research to technology development 
and deployment. In much of the developing world, however, national 
innovation systems are weak and not well developed. Given that 
these emerging markets may well be the first point of market entry 
for many technologies, it is necessary to think of downstream market 
and commercialization linkages, in addition to upstream investments 
in research and development. While an approach such as the DoE’s 
SunShot initiative that emphasizes applied R&D may be appropriate 
for countries like the US where there is a mature innovation ecosystem 
that can move new technologies into the market, additional and 
complementary interventions will be needed in developing countries 
where these linkages are not well established.
 
• The clean energy transition is more than just a product transition: 
Energy technologies are not just isolated physical artifacts, but complex 
socio-technical regimes that include hardware (devices, equipment, 
etc.), software (awareness, information, know-how, etc.), human 
resources (quality and quantity), financial resources, and enabling 
environments (regulatory frameworks, institutional arrangements, 
infrastructure). Consequently, the challenge of decarbonization is 
more than replacing one product technology by another – it involves 
changing an entire socio-technical regime or system. An all-electric 
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transport future, for instance, will involve a change of not only the 
hardware in terms of the drive train of automobiles or batteries but 
also the rest of the ecosystem which include a range of ancillary 
businesses that have evolved around a particular technology system of 
a combination of gasoline and the internal combustion engines. For 
example, will fuelling stations become battery replacement stops?
• Heterogeneity and variety are key for the clean energy transition: 
Moving to a low-carbon future will likely need an ‘all of the above’ 
approach – there is no single technology silver bullet. Unlike in 
the case of the Montreal Protocol where the challenge was finding 
and deploying a substitute for a specific product, carbon is deeply 
embedded into our entire economic fabric. In the absence of a single 
technological solution, the technology and innovation architecture 
needs to encourage experimentation, heterogeneity and variety. For 
example, what sorts of renewable energy technologies will replace 
centralized fossil based electricity generation? Centralized or 
distributed?
 
In many situations, distributed solar thermal with combined 
heat and power may be more attractive than centralized PV. Hybrid 
renewable energy solutions often have better economics than 
those that rely on a single source. Further, solutions may need to 
be customized, and the process of customization and localization 
itself may generate indirect economic benefits beyond the direct 
benefit of electrification. For example, in a country like India, there may 
be interesting possibilities for connecting renewable energy 
technologies with rural industries. And so, simply replacing 
500 mw coal power plants by the equivalent of utility scale solar PV 
might potentially miss out on a much larger opportunity for connecting 
the energy agenda with the rural economic development agenda.
• Ensuring equitable distribution of not just the costs, but also 
the benefits of the clean energy transition (the political economy 
of decarbonization): The transition to a clean energy future 
is creative destruction in its fullest sense which means that 
there will be winners and losers. While there is much talk about 
the environmental benefits of clean energy, from a developing 
country perspective, the question about the distribution of the costs 
and benefits of this transition and particularly the economic returns 
remains. It is important to remember that resource rents fuelled 
much of the wealth creation in the early days of the 20th century, 
though in many countries it was as much of a resource curse as a 
resource blessing.
Of course, in the case of the clean energy transition, resource rents 
will be replaced by knowledge rents because the exploitation of 
renewable resources requires technology, while the resource itself is 
essentially free. Among other aspects, this increases the importance 
of IP. The question then is to whom do these returns accrue? Will 
the economic returns reinforce the current inequalities in distribution 
of wealth across and within countries? Or, can the transition also 
lead to a greater democratization and sharing of the returns from the 
transition?
sOME PRACTICAl NEXT sTEPs 
Even as we work towards addressing the key issues mentioned above, 
a good starting point might be to identify practical next steps that 
can build on current initiatives, and which address some important 
constraints and barriers. Five specific ideas might form the core of a 
near-term agenda for technology in the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement:
 
• Mission Innovation is a welcome step, but how can the domestic 
R&D efforts in different countries be connected and linked to 
accelerate the technology cycle, both with regard to R&D as well as 
eventual commercialization? Can the multilateral process support 
joint development or collaborative technology development?
 
• Scaling up existing technology cooperation mechanisms: After 
a careful review and assessment of lessons learnt, existing bilateral 
mechanisms such as the US-India Joint Clean Energy R&D 
Centre ( JCERDC) could be scaled-up and potentially adapted to a 
multilateral setting. For example, can these collaborative development 
projects have stronger application/commercialization prospects, 
perhaps by setting specific technology goals/deliverables? Can 
these projects address a broad range of technology areas? How can 
the private sector be most effectively engaged in these collaborative 
projects?
 
• Adapting and adopting existing mechanisms for the multilateral 
process: There are mechanisms for collaborative R&D and early 
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stage technology development that include strong private sector 
participation that could be examined and adapted/supported under 
the multilateral process. Examples include models such as the US-
Israel BIRD Foundation, which funds joint industry-industry 
collaborative projects that are closer towards commercialization.
• Finding creative solutions/approaches for Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) issues: IPR is often the ‘third rail’ of international 
negotiations, as there are some countries that are completely allergic 
to any mention of it. However, in practice, there are many situations 
where it is necessary to find approaches that better balance public 
benefits versus private returns, such as in healthcare. Compulsory 
licensing, march-in rights and patent pools are all examples of 
approaches that try and safeguard returns to innovators while ensuring 
that society benefits from the new technologies. For example, patent 
pools have been used in sectors ranging from manufacturing to 
electronics (MPEG) to biotechnology, including situations where 
the government has at least partly funded their creation. It may be 
worth exploring whether the multilateral process could support the 
creation of suitable patent pools in specific areas of clean energy 
(such as energy storage), perhaps by combining public and private 
and national and multilateral finance. If a private company like Tesla 
can make its IP available in order to grow the market; surely it should 
be possible to devise mechanisms to enhance access to clean energy 
technologies for commercialization and find ways of balancing private 
returns to the inventor with the public (and global) benefits of clean 
energy technologies.
 
• Making the current trade regime more climate friendly: Given 
the overriding global benefits of more rapid mitigation, we need to 
ensure that the current rules and governance process of global trade 
do not act as a constraint or barrier for low-carbon technology 
deployment. In this regard it may be helpful to create a ‘green box’, 
where environmentally sustainable technologies are regarded as 
‘public goods’ and where countries agree to not pursue trade disputes 
in the larger global interest.
Financing Climate Action
Aled Jones
The Paris Agreement was the culmination of a series of high level 
government meetings over many years. It aimed to bring together a 
very complex set of agendas, vested interests and political ambition 
into a unified framework for action. 
In the run up to the Copenhagen Conference of Parties in 2009 the 
global ambition for a legally binding agreement that would deliver 
strong emission reduction targets and delivery mechanisms for 
adaptation seemed set to be delivered. Unfortunately that was not to 
be the case. It took another 6 years for a new way forward to be agreed 
and in the end a lot of the legal nature of the agreement has been 
dropped but some of the ambition does remain. Many commentators 
have argued that the Paris Agreement is as good as we could ever have 
hoped for – but not good enough to tackle climate change. However, it 
may start the momentum towards real change and once the world sees 
a new direction of travel then maybe the ambition can be cemented 
into something more concrete and we can build on this foundation. 
The Paris Agreement sets out three key deliverables out of which 
everything else flows. These are listed under Article 2 (article 1 
lists definitions used in the agreement). Critically the first two 
deliverables are more aspirational targets – keeping temperature below 
2 degrees with an ambition to improve that to below 1.5 degrees and 
supporting adaptation to any climate change due to historic emissions. 
The third deliverable is the mechanism by which the first two can be 
achieved: to provide ‘finance flows consistent with a pathway towards 
low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.’ 
(Article 2c)
Therefore, climate finance is the mechanism by which the world will 
tackle climate change. 
Article 9 expands on the definition of climate finance and makes clear 
that this should be new, significant and involve public funds. 
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Article 9 
3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should 
continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from 
a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting 
the significant role of public funds, through a variety of 
actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and 
taking into account the needs and priorities of developing 
country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should 
represent a progression beyond previous efforts.
4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to 
achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into 
account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of 
developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have 
significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed 
countries and small island developing States, considering the 
need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.
The Paris Agreement also sits alongside two other major international 
frameworks recently agreed – the Sustainable Development Goals and 
‘Financing for Development’. Finance is a key component of all three 
frameworks and any financial flows will need to take into account 
the aspirations and targets contained in all three with estimates of 
an additional $600-800 billion annually for energy investments and 
up to $7 trillion for the overall implementation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals per year. 
This of course represents a substantial challenge in how to mobilise, 
manage and channel the capital needed. In particular raising 
potentially large sources of money and creating a pipeline down to 
small projects on the ground is a challenge. Some estimates from the 
United Nations have indicated as much as 80% of these investments 
must come from the private sector. 
Many organisations, groups and partnerships have been set up to 
work on this challenge. This ranges from the formal Green Climate 
Fund to groups focussed on particular issues. One such group is the 
C40 cities initiative. In a recent report entitled New Perspective on 
Climate Finance for Cities, the C40 in partnership with Siemens and 
Citi outline six financing mechanisms. Two key finance mechanisms 
outlined in this report have often been highlighted as a potential 
sources of significant finance. 
The first is through the use of emission trading schemes. Current 
trading schemes have reached $34 billion in value (2015) and 
account for 12% of global emissions. Trading schemes can potentially 
mobilise finance in two ways. The direct engagement of companies 
and organisations who are part of the trading scheme of course moves 
capital around to unlock investments into energy. However, criticism 
of the largest emission trading scheme in the world – the European 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is increasing as it demonstrates 
its inflexibility to cope with economic changes and initial political and 
corporate pressure to ensure financial impacts were minimised. While 
the EU ETS will most likely deliver on its emissions target, partly due 
to the financial and economic crisis still being experienced, it is not 
driving innovation in climate investing. The other use of ETS schemes 
is to use the tax or some surplus emission credits to channel funds to 
other regions and countries. While this type of mechanism has been 
used for many years now it is still at a very small scale compared to 
what is required and critics often argue that this can lead to market 
distortion that also hinders climate investing. 
The second finance mechanism is that of green bonds. The green 
bonds market has been growing rapidly over the past decade with early 
issuances from multilateral development banks, such as the World 
Bank, leading the way for a much wider engagement. Estimates put 
green bond issuances in 2015 between $50 and $70 billion covering 
energy, buildings, transport and water. Emerging economies are now 
seen as leading the development of the green bond market. 
Direct public finance is still an important issue. Developing countries 
have long argued that historic emissions and the impact of climate 
change within their countries should result in climate finance 
flows from developed to developing countries. The Green Climate 
Fund, set up as part of the commitment to the Paris Agreement 
and the negotiations that led up to the agreement, has $10 billion 
in committed development aid. This money, alongside other flows 
through international finance institutions and export credit agencies, 
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should contribute in part to meeting the commitment to mobilise 
$100 billion a year by 2020. Various international bodies put a figure 
of between $180 to 540 billion a year as the total required investment 
flow between 2010 and 2030. However, the current $10 billion 
committed is a total amount and not an annual flow. 
In 2016, as part of China’s Presidency of the G20 a new Green 
Finance Study Group has been set up and is chaired by China and 
the UK. This new group will explore “how to enhance the ability of 
the financial system to mobilize private capital for green investment”. 
It will look at banks, bond markets and institutional investors and the 
barriers they face to climate investing. Given that private finance is 
expected to make up to 80% of the total investments, removing these 
barriers and creating enabling conditions is urgently needed. 
The Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance, a public-private 
partnership involving the governments of the UK, Germany, US, 
Denmark and Netherlands as well as Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch, Willis Group and others, is starting to pilot specific finance 
mechanisms to address certain barriers in climate investing. These 
include platforms for sharing risk and specific projects in energy 
efficiency and water infrastructure. Additionally, and importantly, the 
Oasis Platform which provides analytic tools that can be used to better 
understand and manage risks in investment will be made available. 
Given the need to mobilise and move capital into developing countries 
there has been a lot of focus on the structures that would allow this 
to happen at scale. Of course climate finance also needs to occur at 
home – in whichever country you are resident. Schemes such as the 
ETS should help deploy capital in an optimal way but further direct 
funding through local funds, private equity investments or debt is 
needed to meet this challenge. Often these are better managed and 
implemented locally but capturing information and sharing lessons 
between regions is vital for their success and growth. Linking climate 
financing to other local issues can also boost investments – such as 
the need to tackle air quality issues in cities or the need for increased 
investment in rural economic development. Several central banks are 
starting to argue that climate change presents a real risk and therefore 
public investing into this sector, or at least better risk assessment of 
the economy such as the Bank of England’s prudential review of the 
UK insurance sector, is growing.
Current data suggests private sector investments account for 57% 
of the climate investment in developing countries and 88% in 
developed countries. Therefore, the figure of 80% of total investment 
coming from the private sector seems feasible although the scale of 
investment needs to increase significantly in both developed and 
developing countries. Support is needed to help developing countries 
mature their investment climate so that the risks involved come down 
and allow investments with appropriate rates of return to be made. In 
developing countries current estimated climate finance, 12% of which 
goes into adaptation and the rest into mitigation, needs to be more 
than double to meet the required investments. 
However, challenges remain in implementing climate finance. As with 
the EU ETS other climate finance programmes are facing a range of 
criticism from various bodies. Whether these are critiques relating to 
the additional nature of aid money or particular technologies such 
as biofuels which may or may not contribute to mitigating climate 
change the particular definitions used for deploying finance need 
to be clarified. For example, many see the possibility of the Green 
Climate Fund investing in a proposed renewable energy scheme by 
Deutsche Bank as demonstration that it is not taking on the more 
challenging investments and opting for already profitable schemes. At 
worse some investments are described as ‘greenwash’. 
Meanwhile domestic politics often gets in the way of progressive 
and far sighted ambition. The US House of Representatives recently 
voted to stop the Obama administration from providing money to the 
Green Climate Fund. The divided nature of US politics will continue 
to frustrate efforts to ensure a global coalition which remains stable 
over time. 
At the heart of climate finance is the ability to move capital from 
carbon intensive industries to cleaner sectors. This is the goal of all 
climate finance initiatives in the end but subsidies for fossil fuels 
continue. The UN has recently criticised both the UK and Germany 
governments for their continued support through subsidies and tax 
breaks for oil and gas, and coal sectors respectively. 
Therefore, the challenge of meeting the temperature target set out 
in the Paris Agreement still stands and while it is promising that 
the agreement itself acknowledges the central place that climate 
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finance has achieving the necessary mobilisation of funds has many 
barriers. Indeed meeting the investments needed in renewable 
energy technology, transport, energy efficiency and adaptation face 
their own existing challenges. To meet the lower temperature target, 
which requires the mass deployment of biomass energy with carbon 
capture and storage to take carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, will 
require a whole other set of market mechanisms, the development 
of technologies which are totally unproven and a global carbon 
price. Even discussing a global carbon price has proven impossible at 
international negotiations.
New business and financial models are possible. We need bold 
leadership to unlock the potential and shift current markets into new 
cleaner and greener versions. 
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Climate Action 
Beyond Mitigation and 
the Global North
Sander Chan
Paris has seen the most comprehensive kind of framework for non-state 
and sub-national climate action to date. The growing importance of 
such action is part of a larger development towards polycentric climate 
governance in which traditional state based regimes are complemented 
by private and hybrid regimes involving both national and sub-national 
governments, as also civil society, business and investors.
 
This article focuses on the implications for developing countries and 
points out three challenges and criticisms of the outcomes of the Paris 
climate conference to facilitate non-state action. First, both policy 
and academic discussions have in general been biased towards direct 
mitigation actions while neglecting action in developing countries. 
Second, though there is great potential for non-state climate action 
in the global South, many actions remain ‘under the radar’. Third, in 
the period before 2020, the international community is heavily betting 
on non-state and sub-national action. This is a risky strategy when the 
range of options left to prevent dangerous climate change have shrunk.
 
A FACIlITATIVE FRAMEwORK
Paris has seen a surge in efforts to address climate change by a wide 
variety of non-state and sub-national stakeholders, including business, 
investors, civil society, cities and regions. The Non-State Actor Zone 
for Climate Action (NAZCA), a platform launched at the 2014 Lima 
Climate Conference by the Peruvian government in collaboration 
with the UNFCCC, currently features more than 11,000 actions. 
Through initiatives such as NAZCA and high-level events during 
climate conferences, non-state actions have gained greater visibility 
and international acknowledgement. However, increased visibility 
and acknowledgment is not without risk. A lack of guidelines for 
(featured) non-state actions could lead to easy UN stamps of approval 
and green-washing, such that business-as-usual is represented as 
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clean and green. Moreover, without a more systematic tracking of 
climate actions, overall implications for mitigation and adaptation 
to climate change may never be properly understood.1 Nonetheless 
it must be acknowledged that governments have agreed to the most 
comprehensive framework for non-state and sub-national climate 
action to date in Paris.
 
Elements of this framework include (i) an expanded NAZCA 
platform to register non-state and sub-national action; (ii) the 
continuation of technical examination processes for mitigation 
related solutions and enhanced actions before 2020, and a new parallel 
technical examination processes for adaptation related actions; and 
(iii) the installation of ‘high-level champions’ to coordinate activities 
to reach out to a variety of stakeholders.2
 
Together these elements improve visibility and acknowledgement of 
non-state and sub-national climate actions within the international 
climate regime, as well as strengthen the interface between various 
stakeholders and policy makers. Moreover, these elements constitute an 
institutional anchor for the continued mobilization of non-state and sub-
national actors until at least 2020.3 However, this framework is skewed 
towards ‘high impact’ mitigation actions, and does not expressly address 
the under-representation of developing country based stakeholders 
among climate actions.4 Overall, a heavy reliance on non-state and sub-
national actions, even with a more comprehensive framework, remains a 
risky pre-2020 strategy to prevent dangerous climate change.
EMPHAsIs ON HIGH MITIGATION POTENTIAl
A focus on high mitigation potential seems reasonable and necessary 
to prevent dangerous climate change. In the context of the UNFCCC, 
the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), as well as the 
Technical Examination Process (and related meetings) have focused 
on identifying high mitigation potential actions and action areas and 
solutions that are scalable and replicable, though the strategy is not 
without its risks. In the following I would like to comment on three 
elements of ‘high mitigation potential’, namely: ‘high’, ‘mitigation’, 
and ‘potential’.
First, high mitigation potential assumes large-scale action that can 
accrue significant and measurable greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reductions. Large-scale action may be ‘scaled up’ from demonstrated 
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mitigation solutions. However, transformative technologies and 
innovative solutions may (initially) be small-scale, with low mitigation 
potential in absolute terms. Transformative technologies will need to 
be demonstrated before they are applied at scale. A comprehensive 
framework for climate action should, therefore, facilitate innovation 
and allow for the incubation of transformative technologies rather 
than only promote large-scale solutions.
Second, high mitigation potential implies a greater focus on GHG 
emissions reductions than on other aspects of climate change, most 
notably problems related to resilience and adaptation to climate 
change impacts. However, a facilitative framework should not 
ignore the need for adaptation and greater resilience for at least 
three reasons:
 
• Given that many developing countries have long been sceptical 
of greater non-state and sub-national engagement, their political 
support for such engagement will depend on sustainability co-benefits 
of climate actions, rather than only mitigation.5
 
• To some extent the post-Paris framework for non-state and sub-
national climate action addresses the imbalance between mitigation 
and adaptation by extending the Technical Examination Process to 
adaptation.6 However, adaptation and resilience actions still need 
more support to become effective, as these actions have been relatively 
underperforming.7
 
• A lot of actions labelled ‘high mitigation potential’ are in fact 
not directly aimed at mitigation.8 Rather, they address a variety of 
other climate related challenges, including adaptation and aspects 
of sustainable development. Their designation as ‘high mitigation 
potential’ is more often a political projection rather than a reflection 
of the actual and self-stated purposes of climate actions.
Third, the potential of climate actions is often defended on theoretical 
grounds and more likely to differ from actual impacts. Theoretically 
speaking, only a few targeted non-state actions and sub-national 
efforts in high emission sectors could close the global mitigation gap.9 
 
There are, however, problems in realizing this potential.
For one, newly emerging actions rarely help set mitigation targets. Even 
if they do, their mitigation potential falls (far) short of actually closing 
the global mitigation gap.10 Current research suggests that non-state 
and sub-national actions rarely meet – let alone over-achieve – their 
targets.11 Therefore, a simplistic focus on high mitigation potential 
may lead to unwarranted and overly optimistic estimations of non-
state and sub-national efforts.
 
An associated concern relates to the double counting of GHG 
emission reductions. For instance, reductions by a city action may 
be simultaneously counted as reductions by the city, region, and/
or country in which an action takes place.12 This raises the question 
whether separate emissions accounting at the level of individual 
climate actions is possible and necessary. I argue that a standardized 
accounting methodology for emissions across all climate actions is 
undesirable for political and practical reasons.
 
First, in the context of the UNFCCC, all emissions accounting 
occurs at the national level. Second, when non-state and sub-
national climate actions are subject to rigid Monitoring, Reporting 
and Verification (MRV), they are likely to be seen in competition 
with the international UNFCCC regime. Moreover, quantified 
emission reductions by climate actions should not become a reason 
for governments to resile from their mitigation responsibilities. 
Third, most climate actions would not benefit from, or even be in a 
position to conduct rigid MRV. Only a few climate actions set direct 
mitigation targets; many more focus elsewhere. For instance, an action 
could aim to improve health by combating air pollution – while also 
generating emissions reduction as a ‘co-benefit’. It is doubtful whether 
smaller actions should especially invest their scarce capacities into 
standardized MRV, in particular when mitigation is not the main 
purpose.
Nonetheless, there is analytical value in tracking climate actions 
and their mitigation impacts to demonstrate particularly effective 
solutions and to better understand the scale and aggregate impact of 
climate actions. The task of tracking non-state climate action, however, 
should not burden the UNFCCC process, the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
or smaller-scale climate actions and those that do not primarily focus 
on mitigation. Existing initiatives such as CDP (for business) and 
ICLEI’s Carbonn (for cities) should continue to play a role in the 
tracking of climate actions. Moreover, the analytical community, 
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including researchers, experts and consultants, have already conducted 
studies and set up databases to track climate actions.13 Most studies 
and data collection initiatives, however, have focused on tracking 
promises and mitigation potential (see above). What really matters 
is to determine what climate actions actually achieve, and under what 
circumstances.
UNDERREPREsENTATION OF THE DEVElOPING 
wORlD
Multiple studies confirm that developing country based stakeholders 
are vastly under-represented in non-state and sub-national climate 
actions.14 While most climate actions (claim to) implement across 
the developing world, the actions seem to be primarily led by Europe 
or North American based actors. This pattern seems to reflect an 
imbalanced reality in which major North based actors define design, 
fund, and manage climate actions.
 
Observed imbalances may also be due to a selection bias in international 
processes (such as the existing Technical Examination Process) and 
platforms such as NAZCA. Their focus on ‘high mitigation potential’ 
directs attention to high profile actions, for instance by multinational 
corporations mostly based in the global North, while ignoring many 
smaller and community based resilience and adaptation actions in 
developing countries. A similar selection bias is also found in research, 
most studies on non-state and sub-national climate action are chiefly 
concerned with mitigation.15 Very few studies take into account 
sustainability impacts.16
 
To effectively respond to the under-representation of developing 
country based non-state and sub-national stakeholders, a 
comprehensive framework should both help improve the visibility 
of non-state and sub-national action in developing countries and 
also reach out to non-state and sub-national stakeholders in the 
developing world. Efforts have been undertaken to improve the 
visibility of climate actions in developing countries, most notably in 
the contexts of the 2014 UN Climate Summit and the UNFCCC’s 
Momentum for Change Initiatives.
In the run-up to the Paris Climate Conference, the organizing team 
of the 2014 UN Climate Summit mobilized new and enhanced 
climate non-state, sub-national and cooperative initiatives across 
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eight ‘action areas’. Initially these areas encompassed sectors with 
high mitigation potential, such as transport, energy and forests. 
However, to better accommodate development needs, ‘resilience’ was 
added as a separate climate action area.17 Resilience actions focused 
more on the needs of developing countries, in particular low-income 
economies.18 However, a year after being launched, it became clear 
that progress on this front was slow and that many countries had 
failed to start work.
wHICH ACTORs TO MOBIlIZE?
The UNFCCC secretariat features climate actions with development 
benefits in its ‘Momentum for Change’ campaign. The campaign 
highlights initiatives in four focus areas: ‘urban poor’ (‘recognizing 
climate action that improves the lives of impoverished people in 
urban communities’); ‘women for results’ (‘recognizing the critical 
leadership and participation of women in addressing climate change’); 
‘financing for climate friendly investment’ (‘recognizing successful 
and innovate climate smart activities’); ‘ICT solutions’ (‘recognizing 
successful climate change activities in the field of information and 
communication technology’). Although the Momentum for Change 
campaign highlights wider economic, social and environmental 
challenges, it does not directly redress imbalances between developing 
and developed countries. In fact, a large majority of initiatives winning 
the ‘Momentum for Change Lighthouse Activity Award’ is led by 
stakeholders based in the developed countries.19
 
To address the under-representation of developing country based 
stakeholders, continued efforts are necessary. One promising 
development is the incorporation of the resilience action area in the 
‘Action Agenda’, initiated by the French and Peruvian governments, 
the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the Executive Office of the Secretary 
of the United Nations. However, not all developing country based 
climate actions are addressing resilience, and long-term attention is 
needed to improve the visibility of developing country based climate 
actions. While parts of the action agenda has been mandated in 
Paris (in particular relating to pre-2020 action), specific attention to 
stakeholders in developing countries is not guaranteed. For instance, 
the Momentum for Change campaign is financed through the 
budget of the UNFCCC Secretariat, and contingent on the political 
commitment by the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and the 
(quiet) consent of Parties to the UNFCCC.
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The most visible activities to reach out to in the developing world 
happen at climate conferences, for instance through so-called ‘High-
Level Meetings on Climate Action’ (or ‘Action Days’). However, 
it is questionable whether such events are suitable for facilitating 
climate action in the developing world. Stakeholders from developing 
countries may have a limited (e.g. financial) capacity to be present 
at these events. While such events provide a rare interface between 
negotiators and non-state and sub-national stakeholders, developing 
country delegations are usually minimally staffed and need to focus 
on simultaneous negotiations rather than side events. Regional or 
national events and processes to explore the potential of non-state and 
sub-national climate action in developing countries may better address 
the limitations of smaller developing country based stakeholders and 
governments.
 
Not only is there huge potential, but also a need for global South 
based stakeholder engagement in climate action. In particular, the 
involvement of cities in developing countries as drivers of climate 
action will be vital in the next decade. Future infrastructure alone, 
mostly in the urban global South, would require an estimated third 
of the remaining carbon budget.20 The good news is that in the 
run-up to Paris many commitments have been made by cities and 
regions. Moreover, cities in developing countries are not necessarily 
under-represented in climate actions such as the ‘C40’ initiative or the 
‘Compact of Mayors’, although in other transnational networks they 
remain under-represented.21 Many city commitments, however, are 
declarational in nature, for instance in the Paris City Hall Declaration 
in which mayors promised to exceed the Paris Agreement targets. 
Engaging cities in the global South is a first step, but commitments 
and promises need to become actionable. Concerted efforts by the 
UNFCCC, the wider UN system and governments should help the 
realization of city commitments, for instance by facilitating access to 
expertise and finance.
Another, relatively neglected type of stakeholder is business in the 
global South. Efforts by North based multinational corporations 
attract much attention at the global stage. However, for most 
developing countries, small and medium sized enterprises are of 
greater economic and social importance. One option to increase local 
business engagement is to focus on upgrading global value chains 
instead of a single (multinational) corporation. This would create 
opportunities for smaller suppliers in developing countries to innovate 
and create more value. Additionally, the role of business should 
also not be narrowed down to private business alone. State owned 
enterprises are important drivers and inhibitors of climate action, 
especially in emerging countries like China, Vietnam and India.
OVERRElIANCE ON PRE-2020 NON-sTATE AND 
sUBNATIONAl ACTION?
At the 2011 Durban Climate Conference, governments agreed 
to a separate work stream on pre-2020 mitigation action in the 
negotiations towards a new agreement. Pre-2020 climate action is 
necessary to increase the likelihood of limiting the increase of global 
average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This 
continues to hold true after Paris, as commitment cycles in which 
countries update or communicate their climate pledges will only take 
effect after 2020.
 
The only agreed strategy on pre-2020 climate action heavily 
relies on dialogue with non-state and sub-national stakeholders, 
information sharing, and the ‘technical examination processes’ 
on mitigation and adaptation. This is a high risk strategy, since 
very little is known about the effectiveness of non-state and sub-
national climate action. Non-state and sub-national actions do not 
seem a safe bet to produce the pre-2020 results that would allow 
for a peak and decline of GHG concentration levels by the mid-
century (as described in RCP 2.6 and RCP 24.5 scenarios, IPCC 
AR5).22 First, the gap between potential and realized emissions 
reductions is likely to be wide (see above). Second, there is also 
political risk in relying on non-state and sub-national climate 
actions in the pre-2020 period.
 
The post-Paris Action Agenda remains overly dependent on the 
political whims of governments and political leaders. High-level 
leadership changes within the UN system, in particular a new 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and a new Secretary General 
of the United Nations will impact on efforts to engage non-state 
action. A greater reliance on non-state and sub-national climate 
actions also requires a high level of political commitment to a more 
comprehensive facilitative framework that not only solicits promises 
and commitments, but also encourages real mitigation and adaptation 
contributions.
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There is little doubt that Paris has seen the emergence of the most 
comprehensive framework for climate action yet. The Paris COP 
decision has expanded technical examination processes that include 
non-state and sub-national stakeholders; it has also reaffirmed the 
NAZCA platform which gives visibility to over 11,000 climate 
actions; and it institutionalized a longer-term Action Agenda by the 
appointment of high-level champions for climate action. Nevertheless, 
this framework is not comprehensive enough. Functionally, it is far too 
narrowly focused on actions with a ‘high mitigation potential’, while 
adaptation actions go relatively under-appreciated. In participatory 
terms, the action agenda does little to address the relative under-
representation of stakeholders based in the global South. Therefore, 
the post-Paris Action Agenda should combine a broader focus on 
climate impacts with broad engagement with actors in the global 
South.
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Contextualizing and linking 
Climate Commitments
Amy Weinfurter
The Paris Climate Conference was remarkable on several fronts. In 
addition to the agreement’s movement towards a new, ‘bottom-up’ 
style of goal-setting, the conference embraced action from cities, 
regions, companies, investors, and civil society organizations at 
an unprecedented scale. On 4 December 2015, over 400 mayors, 
representing more than 650 million people, spoke out in support 
of climate action at the Summit for Local Leaders.1 Nearly 5,000 
companies, hailing from more than 88 countries, and representing 
over $38 trillion USD in revenue, have pledged to mitigate their 
emissions, support adaptation efforts, or finance climate action.2 As 
these efforts continue to grow, efforts to understand and quantify 
their contributions to climate adaptation, mitigation, and finance are 
increasingly vital.
 
Data and analysis will play a central role in ensuring the successful 
implementation of climate action from sub-national (i.e., state 
and region) and non-state (i.e., business, investor, and civil society 
organization) actors. These commitments could help fill the gap 
between the mitigation the world needs to prevent the most 
devastating impacts of global warming, and the actions countries have 
pledged. As part of the Paris Climate Conference, countries submitted 
post-2020 climate action plans, or Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While they represent 
an increase in global ambition, these plans still leave a 12 gigaton gap 
– slightly more than China’s 2012 emissions3 – between the action 
that has been pledged, and the action scientists deem necessary to 
keep the world on a safe warming trajectory.4
 
Climate action from cities, regions, the private sector and civil society 
could help countries meet their existing targets, and help fill in this 
mitigation gap. However, sub-national and non-state commitments 
are only now beginning to be closely analyzed, and the level of funding, 
planning and resources dedicated to ensuring their implementation 
varies widely.5 Measuring their progress will be vital to ensuring an 
accurate and realistic picture of their ability to contribute to national 
and global climate goals.
EFFORTs TO UNDERsTAND THE sUB-NATIONAl 
AND NON-sTATE ClIMATE ACTIONs CAN BE 
EXPlORED FROM THREE ANGlEs
• The global mobilization of sub-national and non-state actors, 
and the common themes, trends and aggregate impact of their 
commitments.
• The degree of horizontal integration, or alignment between 
peer networks of cities, states, companies, investors and civil society 
organizations.
• The level of vertical integration, or alignment between local, 
regional, and national climate action frameworks.
More accurately understanding non-state and sub-national climate 
action from all of these angles is crucial to ensuring the successful  
implementation and growth of this promising array of pledges and 
commitments. 
AssEssING THE sCOPE AND IMPACT OF  
sUB-NATIONAl AND NON-sTATE ACTORs
The scope of sub-national and non-state climate action can be assessed 
in terms of both the profile of its participating actors, and the content 
of their mitigation, adaptation, or finance commitments. A growing 
body of recent research has characterized and quantified the emissions 
impact of commitments from different repositories of sub-national 
and non-state climate actions.6 The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate 
Action (or NAZCA platform) represents the largest current collection 
of these commitments, synthesizing over 11,000 commitments to 
climate action contributed by seven different data providers. Launched 
at COP20 in December 2014, the platform highlights the extent of 
climate action occurring voluntarily, outside of national governments.
 
The participation captured by the NAZCA platform tells an 
encouraging story. A recent analysis of the platform’s contents found 
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that NAZCA includes cities and regions representing 17 per cent of 
the global population, along with nearly two-thirds (61 per cent) of 
the 500 companies with the world’s largest market capitalizations.7,8 
Sixty-one per cent of the companies listed on NAZCA are members 
of the world’s largest public companies,9 representing approximately 
$19.2 trillion USD in revenue. The platform also includes 15 of the 20 
banks with the world’s largest market capitalization.10
While this overall level of engagement tells a positive story about 
the broad scope of climate action and the growing leadership of key 
cities, companies, and organizations, some gaps remain. In terms of its 
representation of climate action specific to India, NAZCA includes 29 
climate commitments from 14 Indian cities and regions, focused on 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and resilience. Globally, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency also emerge as the most common themes 
in city and regional climate action. Together, these cities and regions 
represent approximately 28 million people, or just over 2 per cent of 
India’s population of 1.2 billion. Approximately 18 per cent of the 
Indian companies ranked among the world’s largest public companies 
(10 of the 54 Indian companies on the Forbes 2000) are currently 
included on NAZCA, representing over $500 million USD in annual 
revenue. While significant, the activity currently captured by NAZCA 
falls far short of capturing the full scope of climate action currently 
underway in India, mirroring data gaps across the broader landscape 
of non-state and sub-national action.
 
Efforts to collect and understand sub-national and non-state climate 
action currently focus on mitigation activities taking place in the 
Global North. They offer a less complete picture of commitments 
targeting adaptation and resilience, and fail to capture the full 
scale of climate action in developing and emerging economies. 
In part, this reflects the challenge of capturing climate action that is 
often categorized under another label. Efforts to install a bus rapid 
transit system, for instance, might be classified as development 
activities, rather than as mitigation strategies, reflecting the priorities 
of the governments implementing this work. Governments may 
also lack the funding or capacity to implement or monitor climate 
actions. Finding better ways to account for the synergy between 
sustainable development and climate action will help identify 
successful strategies and support the broader adoption of these 
activities.
HORIZONTAl INTEGRATION: CHAllENGEs AND 
OPPORTUNITIEs
Even when a climate commitment is captured completely by the 
platform, research to contextualize it is key to understanding its 
ability to generate meaningful greenhouse gas reductions. For 
instance, though NAZCA includes 15 of the world’s 20 largest 
banks, these institutions’ commitments target the footprints of their 
operations, rather than the more significant emissions embedded 
in their investment decisions.11 Emissions reduction targets from 
companies and investors range from a low of 0.3 per cent, pledged 
by a utilities company, to the Danish Lego Group’s commitment to 
cut hundred per cent of its operational emissions through renewable 
energy procurement.12 Across sectors, average mitigation reduction 
targets span goals of 31.7 per cent to 14.4 per cent.13
 
Horizontal integration, or the coordination between peer networks 
of climate action, plays a pivotal role in contextualizing and clarifying 
sub-national and non-state climate action. At the moment, data 
providers and climate actors apply different approaches to framing 
their commitments. Reporting requirements also vary widely, and 
comparing or aggregating the data from such heterogeneous systems 
is difficult. The sheer number of climate action networks and types of 
commitments risk overwhelming would-be climate action participants 
and the public. Working towards the harmonization of commitment 
frameworks between different networks would enable a clearer 
assessment of the impact of different types of commitments. A more 
cohesive framework for climate action would make the landscape of 
climate action more legible, making it easier to identify leaders and 
laggards within and across key high emitting sectors.
VERTICAl INTEGRATION: CHAllENGEs  
AND OPPORTUNITIEs
Vertical integration describes the coordination between different 
scales of government, to leverage their respective strengths in order to 
produce more effective climate action.14 Aligning city, state, regional, 
and national climate action planning and reporting helps create 
synergies to help drive climate action forward. For instance, cities 
and regions are well positioned to pilot new policies, which national 
governments can then scale up to meet their mitigation targets. A 
Yale University report investigated the mitigation potential of scaling 
nine innovative local or regional climate actions to the national level, 
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finding that this process could cut 2020 carbon emission by 1.09 
gigatons, narrowing the emissions gap by approximately 10 per cent.15
 
As countries prepare to ‘ratchet up’ the ambition of their climate action 
plans in the five year cycles articulated in the Paris Climate Agreement, 
sub-national and non-state climate action could help identify new 
strategies for achieving national goals. Sub-national governments also 
benefit from these partnerships, as national governments can help 
build capacity to implement and develop mitigation and adaptation 
strategies by supplying financial, technical, and other forms of support. 
Merging sub-national governments’ ability to pilot new solutions 
with the resources and scale of impact national governments could 
help drive climate action forward at both levels.
Understanding the degree of alignment between different levels 
of climate action is also crucial to avoiding double counting (i.e., 
accounting for a city’s emission reductions twice, once on behalf of the 
city and once on behalf of a country’s climate target). Establishing an 
accurate sense of sub-national and non-state contributions to national 
goals helps avoid overestimating the impact of these contributions. 
While sub-national and non-state activities can help spur and 
complement climate action, national leadership will still be essential 
to meeting global goals.
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Building Trust and legitimacy
Vikrom Mathur & Aniruddh Mohan
A paradigm shift occurred in global climate negotiations because of a 
failure to introduce a successor to the Kyoto Protocol based on a top-
down negotiated model of targets. The Paris Agreement has been built 
on the back of ‘bottom-up’ pledges by parties, in a loose, non-punitive 
structure with top-down rules of the game around review and collective 
effort. The relative lack of enforcement written into the Paris Agreement 
has led to accusations of it being weak and inadequate. Nevertheless, 
obituaries of multilateral efforts to prevent dangerous levels of climate 
change should not be written just yet.
 
A growing body of literature post the failure of the Copenhagen talks in 
2009 called for climate governance to adopt more ‘polycentric’ approaches,1 
emphasizing the need for an ambitious ‘direction of travel’ over long-term 
targets and penalties for non-compliance,2 which were hard to agree on. 
In the Paris Agreement, the global community is searching for middle 
ground – a fine balance between bottom-up voluntary contributions and 
top-down rules. A ‘clumsy’ approach to climate policy may just work; 
institutional experts have pointed out the problems with applying ‘simple’, 
‘elegant’ solutions to complex problems such as climate change. Paris 
represents a step away from the rigidity and inflexibility that underpinned 
and then ultimately undermined the Kyoto Protocol.
 
However, in the absence of the incentives and sanctions regime that 
characterized Kyoto, the Paris Agreement will have to rely on new 
avenues to foster cooperation to avoid inadequacy of action, breakdowns 
in implementation and compliance, and lack of progress on climate goals. 
Trust and legitimacy, in particular amongst Parties to the Agreement and 
beyond, will be key to glue the many ‘moving parts’ of the agreement 
together.
 
TRUsT AND lEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAl 
COOPERATION
In a sense, the limited legally binding power in the Paris Agreement 
is what makes its legitimacy all the more important. Legitimacy may 
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refer to the ‘normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought 
to be obeyed.’ 3 In the absence of legal enforcement options, Paris is 
moving beyond the scope of legitimacy solely as a legal concept, instead 
framing it in the context of norms, approaches and expectations. It has 
been noted that lack of a legal basis is no deal breaker for other notions 
of legitimacy in the eyes of actors.4 Julia Black, for instance, makes the 
case for the international Forest Stewardship Council, an institution 
which is seen as legitimate by a number of actors in related industries 
such as chemical and forestry industries and yet lacks any legal basis 
for that perceived legitimacy.5 In polycentric, loose and hybrid regimes 
norms, values and expectations have to be reinforced for securing 
perceptions of legitimacy,6 which in turn may influence behaviour and 
decisions about interests. The success of the Paris Agreement will be 
contingent on favourable perceptions of legitimacy amongst its parties 
for effective implementation, compliance and consensus.
Similarly, enhanced trust amongst Parties to the Agreement and 
beyond will be central to the peer review system proposed in the 
agreement as well as prevention of free-rider problems. While no single 
definition for trust exists in the context of international cooperation,7 
we can nevertheless outline the key principles that shape trust 
amongst actors. Scholars agree that trust refers to an inclination that 
may permit placing the fate of one’s interests in the hands of others.8 
This can certainly be applicable to the climate change arena where 
countries are basing their well-being and, in some cases, survival on 
action that may or may not be taken by others. Trust amongst poorer 
countries and their wealthier counterparts will need to be built to 
ensure that both sets of actors continue to step up ambition of climate 
action and prevent a breakdown in implementation.
 
Trust and legitimacy are, therefore, different but interlinked. Increasing 
levels of trust will be necessary for perceptions of legitimacy – a 
coalition of the willing cannot work if members do not trust each 
other and yet, for them to trust each other and their objectives, the 
legitimacy of agreed goals and actions should be evident. The next 
section deals with both issues and how they are central to many 
aspects of the Paris regime.
ClIMATE REGIME AND IssUEs OF TRUsT
The global climate is a common pool resource (CPR). A limited 
carbon budget remains to prevent dangerous levels of climate change 
and global warming. Governance of the commons usually depend on 
approaches that stress the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. However, Daniel Cole 
points out that climate negotiations may instead be better understood 
as an ‘assurance game’, a concept advanced by Amartya Sen.9 Assurance 
game outcomes depend on perceptions of cooperation and the levels 
of mutual trust built over time amongst actors. Polycentric approaches 
are more likely to build that trust Cole talks about, instead of massive, 
centralized conferences involving thousands of participants in closely 
followed meetings.10 Keohane has further argued that informal, 
bilateral discussions, along with cooperation on a wide variety of 
issues, may be more conducive to building trust than the traditional 
relationships characterized by large, intransigent bureaucracies that 
strictly control discourse and discussion with external actors.11
 
Compromise, as has been noted by Barrett, is also not uncomplicated 
when done in full public spotlight.12 Countries are more likely to 
engage one another constructively if they are not under the pressures 
of large multilateral conversations conducted in full public glare. The 
Paris Agreement may be a step in the right direction in that regard. 
The lead up to Paris, for instance, saw many bilateral agreements 
being signed between countries such as the US-China and US-Brazil, 
accords which helped achieve breakthroughs in larger multilateral 
conversations. Bilateral and minilateral clubs of action will make it 
more likely for common ground to be found between countries that 
may eventually push forward larger multilateral agendas. 
The Paris Agreement’s structure allows for building of trust over time. 
For instance, commitments made by member states are not legally 
binding. However, meeting commitments can lead to building of 
mutual trust. For instance, Ostrom et al. have previously argued that 
trust can be earned by mutual commitments that are credible.13 The 
collective peer review mechanism also helps promote that agenda – 
parties can review the contributions and progress of others. Trust built 
over time through peer confirmation of action can lead to increased 
ambition of action over time. As Cole notes, verifiability is central to 
trust.14 Further, action at lower governance levels which are marked 
by successful cooperation can be useful for fostering trust that then 
translates to all levels of decision making.15
 
Lastly, international relations can be seen to have developed increasing 
levels of trust when leaders of states devolve power and agency to 
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interact with others to lower units of governance in the belief that 
their counterparts are trustworthy.16 In the context of climate change, 
increasing trust among parties to the Paris Agreement may mean 
greater agency transferred to non-state and sub-national actors as well 
as transnational efforts.
lEGITIMACY GOING FORwARD
One interesting new development in the Paris Agreement was the 
reference to climate justice and human rights in the preamble text. 
Climate change is quite simply intertwined with almost every aspect 
of modern economics and politics as well as with issues around social 
justice. The complexities of climate change, both physically and 
otherwise, may mean that climate governance needs to link itself to 
other regimes – issues of trade, human rights, justice or banking and 
finance. Strong interdependencies of impact, causality and action mean 
that the UNFCCC may just be an overspecialized regime for dealing 
with the problem of climate change.17 An attempt to address climate 
change is also an undertaking to transform the very fundamentals 
of our food systems, machinery, electricity grids, transportation and 
economic models, not to mention the patterns of consumption and 
production that have sustained us thus far. Previous action on climate 
change risked being viewed as illegitimate when it failed to account 
for these interconnections and dependencies that significantly affect 
the success of climate action.
 
For instance, the US vs. India case at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) over solar panels illustrates the contradictions at play 
between different regimes. India’s national solar policy has domestic 
content requirements (DCR), which dictate that all investors have to 
source 30 per cent of input locally. The US challenged the DCR at the 
WTO, arguing that it violated India’s commitment to global trade 
rules and discriminated against American firms, who had witnessed 
a 90 per cent fall in solar exports to India from 2011 when India 
imposed the clause. India tried to justify the clause, arguing that it 
was necessary to ensure compliance with its commitments under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). This was, however, rejected by the WTO who ruled 
that international environmental obligations imposed no binding 
commitments on nations and thus were not ‘laws or regulations’ that 
had to be complied with. Naturally, this presents a massive problem. 
Energy transitions should also fuel growth, create jobs and build an 
ecosystem of innovation. If trade regimes reject the legitimacy of 
climate agreements, ambitious action is unlikely to be forthcoming.
Calls for linking regimes of governance, therefore, go hand in hand 
with both polycentricity and issues of legitimacy. Climate action will 
increasingly be viewed as legitimate when it starts to account for the 
core causes and implications of our economic systems – organization 
of labour, international trade, issues around human rights and climate 
induced migration as well as norms around banking which affect 
investments into clean energy. Institutional linkages boost legitimacy 
and external and internal perceptions of legitimacy are in turn critical 
to survival of regimes and institutions.18 Absurd contradictions and 
hindrances such as the WTO case also need to be prevented. The new 
polycentric order emerging in climate governance will benefit from 
extending the actors and stakeholders under the climate umbrella and 
recognizing the opportunities and co-benefits associated with tackling 
concurrent global challenges.
 
Another positive development from Paris is that it is the first climate 
treaty to not only recognize the importance of non-state actors but 
also conceptualize a framework for their action. Non state actors in 
the past had limited sway over international climate governance as 
transnational governance approaches were eschewed in favour of 
centralized multilateralism between member states. However, the Paris 
Agreement explicitly welcomes action by non-state and sub-national 
actors and the COP Decision Text creates a framework for their action. 
All future COPs, for instance, will have a ‘high level action day’ where 
companies and cities report on their efforts, a process directly linked 
under the formal review of the UNFCCC. Furthermore, all actors, not 
just countries, are encouraged to voluntarily pledge commitments on 
climate action.19 Transnational alliances such as the Mission Innovation 
Fund also promise to deliver meaningful contributions to climate action.
Just as time has allowed us to judge Kyoto’s failures in a harsher light, 
so must time and space be allowed to the Paris Agreement before 
adjectives of success or failure become synonymous with the outcomes 
of COP 21. Paris has several unfinished agendas on its plate, and 
dealing with those may be key to the durability and effectiveness of 
the regime. Differentiation, technology, finance, loss and damage and 
review mechanisms all remain unresolved. For breakthroughs in these 
areas, it is important that notions of legitimacy and trust amongst 
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